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INTRODUCTION
For roughly forty years, a reform movement has advocated
for change in the way that courts judge the validity of wills.1
Traditionally, the court merely assesses whether the decedent
complied with the writing, signature, and witnessing formalities
of will-execution.2 If the decedent complied, the will is valid.3 If
the decedent did not comply, the will is invalid, and the court has
no discretion to overlook the formal defect.4 Because this
conventional law results in the invalidity of plainly authentic
wills when decedents fail to comply due to mistake or ignorance,
the reform movement has argued for change so that more
genuine wills are validated.5 Specifically, reformers suggest that
courts should have discretion to validate a noncompliant will
when there is clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the will to be legally effective.6 However, despite broad
support within the legal academy, this reform effort has been
slow to instigate change.7
The reform movement’s struggles can be explained in part by
the way that scholars demonstrate the need for reform, which is
typically focused on the purpose of will formalities.8
A
fundamental tenet of the law of wills is that decedents can
distribute their estates as they choose.9 However, because
decedents are dead at the time of probate, the determination of
testamentary intent cannot be achieved by simply asking them

1
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
179 (9th ed. 2013); see, e.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the
Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 526, 531 (1975); see also infra Part I.
2
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148.
3
See id. at 153.
4
See id. at 171 (“The strict compliance rule creates a conclusive presumption of
invalidity for an imperfectly executed will. Unless every last statutory formality is
complied with exactly, the instrument is denied probate even if there is compelling
evidence that the decedent intended the instrument to be his will.”).
5
See infra Part I.B–C.
6
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997); see also John H. Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s
Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1987).
7
See Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years
Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 577, 580 (2007); see also infra note 107 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 492, 510.
9
See id. at 491; see also Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 883–84 (2012).
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what they intended.10 Thus, to ensure that the court has a
reliable and easily recognizable record of testamentary intent,
the law requires that wills be written, signed, and witnessed.11
These and other related formalities provide the court with robust
evidence that the decedent intended the will to be legally
effective, and therefore testamentary formality’s purpose is to
facilitate the law’s fulfillment of the decedent’s intent.12
Although the traditional law gives the court assurance that
it can safely distribute the decedent’s estate according to the
terms of a formally compliant will,13 critics contend that
requiring courts to invalidate clearly genuine yet formally
defective wills conflicts with formality’s role in the realization of
testamentary intent.14
They argue that the rule of strict
compliance is overly concerned with preventing the validation of
fraudulent or unintended wills and should be more concerned
with validating genuine wills.15 In short, the reform movement
suggests that the rule of strict compliance undermines both the

10
See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1941).
11
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (1999) (“The purpose of statutory formalities . . . is to
determine whether the decedent adopted the document as his or her will.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (2003) (“The main function of the law in this field is to facilitate rather than
regulate. The law serves this function by establishing rules under which sufficiently
reliable determinations can be made regarding the content of the donor’s
intention.”).
12
See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and
the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 391–92 (2001) (“To facilitate realization
of testamentary freedom, the law historically has required individuals to set forth
dispositive desires in a written statement executed with formalities sufficient to
identify to the individual executing the instrument and the world at large that the
writing is intended to be a will.” (footnotes omitted)).
13
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“A competent person not
subject to undue influence, duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument in
strict compliance with all of the Wills Act formalities unless the person intends the
instrument to be his will.”); see also Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60
U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 311 n.18 (2011) (“Few people would undergo such ceremony
without holding testamentary intent.”).
14
See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 235, 235–36 (1996) (“[A] paradox exists: a primary purpose of will formalities is
to ensure that the testator’s final, deliberate intent controls, but judicial insistence
on strict compliance with those formalities frustrates the testator’s intent by
aborting transfers the testator clearly intended to make.”).
15
See Lester, supra note 7, 578–79.
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principle of testamentary freedom and formality’s goal of
effectuating the decedent’s intent,16 and therefore the law’s
insistence on strict compliance should be relaxed.17
The reform movement’s focus on the purpose of testamentary
formality is flawed because it primarily emphasizes the benefit of
reform, namely that the abandonment of strict compliance would
validate more genuine expressions of testamentary intent and
therefore would advance the overall goal of will formalities.
However, by focusing on this benefit, the reform movement’s case
for change largely overlooks the potential costs of abandoning
strict compliance. Just as the writing, signature, and witnessing
formalities serve specific purposes,18 the requirement that all
testators strictly comply with these formalities also serves
various purposes.19 Reform could undermine the objectives of
strict compliance and therefore could have potential costs that
are obscured when the reform movement focuses on the purpose
of will formalities.20 The movement does not completely ignore
the potential costs of reform,21 but because no framework exists
to systematically analyze the effect of reform upon the goals of
strict compliance, these costs are not clearly identified. In the
end, the reform movement’s failure to methodically examine the
purposes of strict compliance has hindered its ability to plainly
demonstrate the rule’s disutility and may contribute to the
movement’s lack of widespread success.
To inject new life into the reform movement, this Article
shifts the discussion regarding reform from an analysis that
focuses on the purpose of will formalities to an analysis that
recognizes the independent roles that formality and strict
compliance play in the law of will-execution. Specifically, this
Article argues that the formalities of will-execution and the rule
16
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 4; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (1999) (“The formalities are
meant to facilitate [an] intent-serving purpose, not to be ends in themselves.”).
17
See infra Part I.B.
18
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part III.
20
For example, Langbein acknowledges that the abandonment of the strict
compliance requirement could have some costs, but he frames them in terms of the
functions of formality rather than in terms of the functions of strict compliance. See
Langbein, supra note 6, at 4 (“In order to escape the rule of strict compliance with
the Wills Act, . . . the case must be made that the benefits of Wills Act formality
would be retained even if the law were changed to excuse execution blunders.”).
21
See, e.g., infra notes 211, 230, and 256.

FINAL_GLOVER

2014]

4/17/2015 12:55 PM

DECOUPLING THE LAW OF WILL-EXECUTION

601

of strict compliance serve similar yet discrete purposes and
therefore the utility of the two should be analyzed separately.22
This way of thinking about the law of will-execution
acknowledges the purposes of strict compliance that could be
undermined by reform and therefore provides a clearer picture of
the potential costs and benefits of reform. Ultimately, this
framework refines the case for reform by uniquely demonstrating
the strict compliance requirement’s disutility,23 and provides
hope that widespread change will one day be forthcoming.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the
context of reform, including the traditional law of will-execution,
the criticism of strict compliance, and the reform movement.
Next, by explaining the purpose of testamentary formality, Part
II serves as the foundation for decoupling the analysis of will
formalities from the analysis of strict compliance. Part III
completes the process of decoupling the law of will-execution by
examining the purpose of strict compliance. Finally, Part IV
explores the implications that the recognition of the independent
purposes of will formalities and strict compliance has for the law
of wills. Specifically, it explains how this framework clarifies the
costs and benefits of reform and how such an analysis ultimately
galvanizes the arguments in favor of change.
I.
A.

THE CONTEXT OF STRICT COMPLIANCE

The Traditional Law of Will-Execution

Formality has long been a part of the will-execution
process,24 and the valid exercise of testamentary power now
generally requires that a will be written, signed by the testator,
and attested by two witnesses.25 In addition to these primary
formalities, a variety of ancillary formalities are required in
various jurisdictions. For example, some states require that
testators and witnesses be in each other’s presence when wills
are signed.26 In other states, testators must attest to the

See infra Part II–III.
See infra Part IV.
24
See Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony–History, Significance, and
Strategies, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 415–18 (1988).
25
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148.
26
See id. at 159.
22
23
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witnesses that the documents before them are their wills, and in
other jurisdictions they must also subscribe wills, meaning that
they must sign at the end of the document.27
Courts traditionally evaluate compliance with these
formalities based upon a rule of strict compliance.28 Pursuant to
this requirement, any error in will-execution invalidates a will,
regardless of how minor or technical the formal defect, and
despite the court’s confidence that the decedent intended the
document to constitute a valid will.29 The court cannot validate a
will based upon other evidence that the testator intended it to be
legally effective.30 Compliance with the prescribed formalities is
the only proof of testamentary intent that the court will
recognize.31
To illustrate how will formalities and the strict compliance
requirement operate, consider the attempted execution of wills by
Hellen and Vasil Pavlinko,32 an immigrant couple from Eastern
Europe.33 Hellen and Vasil spoke little English and were
unfamiliar with the law of wills,34 but both were certain that they
wanted to implement mirror image estate plans. If Hellen died
first, she wanted her property to go to her surviving husband.35
Likewise, if Vasil predeceased Hellen, he wanted his property to
go to his surviving wife.36 Upon the death of the surviving
spouse, both Hellen and Vasil wanted the remainder of their
property to be left to Hellen’s brother.37 To ensure that their
testamentary wishes would be legally memorialized, Hellen and
Vasil consulted an attorney who spoke their native language and
who prepared wills that reflected the couple’s desired estate
plan.38 The couple followed their attorney’s direction and signed
the documents in the presence of the attorney and his assistant.39
See id. at 163.
See id. at 153.
29
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 489.
30
See Bruce H. Mann, Essay, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform
Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035–36 (1994).
31
See id.
32
In re Estate of Pavlinko, 148 A.2d 528, 528 (Pa. 1959).
33
See id. at 531 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
34
Id.
35
See id. at 532.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id. at 531.
39
See id. at 528 (majority opinion).
27
28
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Hellen died several years later.40 Her will was never
submitted for probate, but Vasil took ownership of her property
in accordance with her testamentary intent.41 Eventually, Vasil
also passed away,42 and in an attempt to honor both Hellen and
Vasil’s wishes, Hellen’s brother submitted Vasil’s will to the
probate court to begin the process of claiming ownership of the
remainder of the couple’s property.43 Unfortunately, the court
discovered that the Pavlinkos had not properly executed their
wills, as each of them had mistakenly signed the other’s will.44
Hellen had signed the document that laid out Vasil’s desired
estate plan, and Vasil had signed the document that conveyed
Hellen’s testamentary wishes.45
Insisting on strict compliance, the court concluded that,
because they failed to sign the proper documents, neither Hellen
nor Vasil had executed a valid will.46 Hellen’s brother therefore
could not take ownership of the couple’s property.47 The court
reached this conclusion in the face of clear evidence that both
Hellen and Vasil wanted Hellen’s brother to have the remainder
of their property.48 As the dissenting judge explained, “Everyone
in this case admits that a mistake was made: an honest,
innocent, unambiguous, simple mistake . . . . No one disputes this
brute fact, no one can dispute this granitic, unbudgeable truth.”49
Despite the admittedly “unusual” circumstances of the case and
its “unfortunate” outcome,50 the court held that a will’s form must
take precedent over the testator’s intent, and that Vasil’s will

See id.
See id.
42
Id.
43
See id. Hellen’s brother did not actually submit the document purporting to be
Vasil’s will to probate. Instead he submitted the document that Vasil signed but that
specified Hellen’s estate plan. Id. at 528–29.
44
See id. at 528.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 529.
47
See id. (“While no attempt was made to probate, as Vasil’s will, the writing
which purported to be his will but was signed by Hellen, it could not have been
probated as Vasil’s will, because it was not signed by him at the end thereof.”).
48
See id. at 532 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
49
Id. (“Can anyone go to the graves of the Pavlinkos and say that we do not
know what they meant? They said in English and in Carpathian that they wanted
their property to go to [Hellen’s brother].”).
50
See id. at 528 (majority opinion).
40
41
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was therefore invalid.51 Pavlinko is representative of numerous
similar instances in which the court was certain that the
decedent intended to execute a will but nonetheless invalidated
the will because the decedent failed to strictly comply with the
prescribed formalities.52
B.

The Criticism of Strict Compliance

The specific result in Pavlinko and courts’ general insistence
on strict compliance have generated criticism for being overly
formalistic. Critics contend that the rule of strict compliance
unnecessarily values the form of a will over the substance of the
testator’s intent.53
The court in Pavlinko illustrates this
formalism when it explains, “The decedent may have thought he
had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is
not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or rather
what he failed to do.”54 Critics argue that this formalism conflicts
with the cornerstone of the law of wills, which is the principle
that testators have broad freedom to dispose of their estates, and
that the law’s ultimate purpose is to effectuate the testator’s
intent to exercise this freedom.55

51
See id. at 531 (“Once a Court starts to ignore or alter or rewrite or make
exceptions to clear, plain and unmistakable provisions of the Wills Act in order to
accomplish equity and justice in that particular case, the Wills Act will become a
meaningless, although well intentioned, scrap of paper, and the door will be opened
wide to countless fraudulent claims which the Act successfully bars.”).
52
See Mann, supra note 30, at 1036 (“Courts have routinely invalidated wills for
minor defects in form even in uncontested cases and sometimes even while
conceding—always ruefully, of course—that the document clearly represents the
wishes and intent of the testator.”).
53
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 489 (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh
and relentless formalism. The Wills Act prescribes a particular set of formalities for
executing one’s testament. The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to
void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was
inconsequential.”).
54
Pavlinko, 148 A.2d at 530 (quoting In re Churchill’s Estate, 103 A. 533, 535
(Pa. 1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 4 (“The Wills Act is meant to implement the
decedent’s intent; the paradox in a case [that applies the rule of strict compliance] is
that the Wills Act defeats that intent.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 491–92 (“A
tension is apparent between this principle of ‘free testation and the stiff, formal’
requirements of the Wills Act.” (footnote omitted)); Leslie, supra note 14, at 243
(“The argument for simplifying will formalities and forgiving ‘harmless errors’ in
execution rests on the premise that effectuating testamentary intent, and thus
protecting testamentary freedom, is the primary goal of wills law.”).
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The court in Pavlinko recognized the tension between a will’s
form and the testator’s intent when it openly acknowledged this
consequence of the strict compliance requirement:
It may happen, even frequently, that genuine wills, namely,
wills truly expressing the intentions of the testators, are made
without observation of the required forms; and whenever that
happens, the genuine intention i[f] frustrated by the act of the
Legislature, of which the general object is to give effect to the
intention.56

This conflict between a will’s form and a testator’s intent is
precisely what critics of strict compliance find so troubling.
Although the formality of will-execution long has been a
topic of scholarly discourse,57 criticism of strict compliance began
in earnest with the publication of Professor John Langbein’s 1975
article, entitled Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act.58 In
the article, Langbein criticizes strict compliance based upon a
functional analysis of will formalities,59 and since then a
functional framework has framed the discussion of this area of
the law.60 Instead of relying on the fiction that will formalities
Pavlinko, 148 A.2d at 530 (quoting In re Churchill’s Estate, 103 A. 533, 535
(Pa. 1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
In the final quarter of the twentieth century, “[t]he proper place and scope of
formalities in [the execution of] wills [became] a cause celebre in recent legal
literature.” Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 914 n.103 (1992). Earlier scholars also
focused on the formality of will-execution. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10;
Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act? A Comment on the Wills Provisions of
the Model Probate Code, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948). Legal scholars’ interest in will
formalities and strict compliance has extended into the twenty-first century. See,
e.g., Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless Error in Will Execution: The Israeli
Experience, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 27 (2010).
58
See generally Langbein, supra note 1. This push for reform has been
characterized as the “Langbein Revolution.” Lloyd Bonfield, Essay, Reforming the
Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from the Past, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 1893, 1896 (1996).
59
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 489, 491–98.
60
See Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 168 (1988).
The functional analysis of will formalities, however, predated Langbein. See, e.g.,
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5–13. Moreover, the functional analysis of
formality in other contexts predates the functional analysis of testamentary
formality. See, e.g., Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels
and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341,
342 (1926) (analyzing the delivery requirement of inter vivos donative transfers and
explaining that “the only sound and useful approach to a problem such as this is the
pragmatic approach, i. e., [sic] the approach which defines a thing in terms of its
functions”).
56
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possess inherent value, functionalists, such as Langbein, seek to
identify the purposes of testamentary formality.61
When analyzed within this framework, formalities are
explained as fulfilling several functions that ensure that a will
accurately and reliably reflects the testator’s intent.62 The origin
of this functional framework dates back as far as 1941, when
Professor Ashbel Gulliver and his research assistant, Catherine
Tilson, published a seminal work on the topic.63 Gulliver and
Tilson explain that will formalities serve three functions that
might justify their place in the law of wills.64 First, will
formalities serve an evidentiary function by providing reliable
evidence that the testator intended a particular document to
constitute a legally effective will.65
Second, they serve a
protective function by reducing the possibility of fraudulent
wills.66 Finally, Gulliver and Tilson explain that will formalities
serve a cautionary function by reminding the testator of the legal
significance of executing a will.67
It is upon this framework that Langbein builds his
functional analysis of testamentary formality, with his primary
contribution being the placement of the channeling function
alongside those functions identified by Gulliver and Tilson.68
Langbein explains that will formalities serve this channeling
function by funneling all wills into a substantially similar form.69
Because all wills are written, signed, and witnessed, probate
courts can more efficiently determine whether the testator
intended to execute a valid will.70 Since the publication of
61
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5–13; Langbein, supra note 1, at 491–
98 (drawing heavily from the Gulliver and Tilson analysis).
62
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (1999) (“The purpose of the statutory formalities . . . is to
determine whether the decedent adopted the document as his or her will.”); see also
In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991) (“The primary purpose of [will]
formalities is to ensure that the document reflects the uncoerced intent of the
testator.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 492 (“The formalities are designed to perform
functions which will assure that [the testator’s] estate really is distributed according
to his intention.”).
63
See generally Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10.
64
See id. at 5–13.
65
See id. at 6–8.
66
See id. at 9–10.
67
See id. at 5 (referring to this function as the ritual function).
68
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 493–94.
69
See id. at 494.
70
See id.
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Langbein’s work, the functional framework of testamentary
formality generally has included the evidentiary, protective,
cautionary, and channeling functions.71
Based on this understanding of testamentary formality,
functionalists argue that because strict compliance frequently
undermines the testator’s intent, the effects of the strict
compliance requirement are at odds with the overarching goal
and specific functions of will formalities.72 This conflict led
Langbein to conclude that the formalism of strict compliance is
“mistaken and needless.”73 Indeed, he proclaimed that “we
should shudder that we still inflict upon our citizens the injustice
of the traditional law.”74 Legal scholars have widely echoed this
critique,75 and few argue that the legal effectiveness of a will
should be based upon the traditional rule of strict compliance.76
C.

The Reform Movement

The criticism of the traditional law of will-execution has
fueled a reform movement that seeks to ease the harshness of the
strict compliance requirement.77 Two types of reform can achieve
this result. First, the array of prescribed formalities can be
altered.78 The rationale behind this reform is that if the process
of will-execution is less difficult, then the strict compliance
requirement will invalidate fewer genuine expressions of

See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule
and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 256 n.473 (1991).
72
See Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent:
The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN.
L. REV. 453, 457 (2002) (“[F]ormality rules for will execution prevent mistakes about
intent and provide a means for expressing intent. At the same time, in a significant
number of cases they may frustrate not only an individual testator’s intent but also
the principal objective of the law of wills.”).
73
Langbein, supra note 1, at 489.
74
Langbein, supra note 6, at 54.
75
See, e.g., Lester, supra note 7, at 578–79; James Lindgren, Abolishing the
Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 541–43 (1990); Mann, supra
note 30, at 1038, 1059–60.
76
Some commentators have cautioned against reducing the role of formalities in
the will-execution process. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 58, at 1896; John V. Orth,
Wills Act Formalities: How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L.J. 73, 74–75, 81 (2008).
77
See, e.g., Lester, supra note 7, at 579.
78
See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611,
615 (1988).
71
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testamentary intent.79 Second, the rule of strict compliance can
be replaced with a relaxed formal compliance standard that
would allow the court to validate a formally deficient will despite
the lack of strict compliance.80 Under this reform, an error in
will-execution would not necessarily lead to the invalidation of
the will.81 Instead, the court could validate the will based upon
other evidence that the testator intended the will to be legally
effective.82
Various plans to reduce or replace the formalities of willexecution have been proposed.83 The most successful is the
elimination of a variety of ancillary formalities, such as the
requirement that testators and attesting witnesses be in each
other’s presence and the requirement that testators announce to
the attesting witnesses that the documents before them are their
wills.84 The Uniform Law Commission championed this reform in
its 1969 Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).85 By requiring merely a
written document, the testator’s signature, and two witnesses,
will-execution under the UPC is a less formal process than under
traditional law.86 Langbein explains this reform’s rationale:
“Doubtless the draftsmen balanced the injustice brought about by
technical violations of the publication and presence requirements
and decided that the . . . value of those two former requisites was
not worth the price in wills invalidated for defective
See id. at 614.
See Lester, supra note 7, at 579.
81
See id.
82
See id. at 579–80.
83
For example, Professor James Lindgren proposed the elimination of the
attestation requirement. Lindgren, supra note 75, at 543, 572–73. Lindgren argues
that “[b]y continuing to insist on attestation, our current legal system does not
protect testators from others,” and that “[i]nstead, it protects many testators from
effectuating their own estate plans.” Id. at 573. Lindgren’s proposal has not
prompted widespread reform; only Pennsylvania does not require attestation. See 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 2014). Another proposed reform is to allow
testators to have their wills notarized instead of requiring attestation by two
witnesses. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J.
83, 84–86 (2008).
84
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f (1999).
85
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 510.
86
As the official comment explains, “The formalities for execution of a witnessed
will have been reduced to a minimum.” The comment continues, “The intent is to
validate wills which meet the minimal formalities of the statute.” UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-502 cmt. (1969).
79
80
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compliance.”87 Roughly twenty states have enacted statutes
similar to the UPC, and several other states, while not going as
far as the UPC, do not require all of the traditional ancillary
formalities.88
The purpose of reducing the number of formalities is to
decrease the likelihood that a genuine expression of
testamentary intent is invalidated by the rule of strict
compliance.89 However, this reform does not ensure that all
legitimate attempts to execute a will are legally effective.
Consider, for example, the situation in Pavlinko.90 Although the
court was sure that the Pavlinkos intended to execute wills,
neither Hellen’s nor Vasil’s will would be valid under the UPC’s
will formalities provision because they did not sign the proper
documents.
Even under the UPC’s minimal formal
requirements, the testator must sign the will.91 Therefore, the
court’s application of the strict compliance requirement would
still undermine the Pavlinkos’ testamentary intent.
The strict compliance requirement’s effect of invalidating
legitimate wills even under a regime of minimal formalities can
be remedied with the second type of reform at the reform
movement’s disposal. This reform is to replace the rule of strict
compliance with a relaxed formal compliance standard. Critics of
strict compliance argue that the validity of a will should depend
less upon whether the testator strictly complied with the
prescribed formalities and more upon whether the testator
intended to execute a will.92 With this objective in place,
proponents of reform have suggested two alternatives to the
requirement of strict compliance: (1) the substantial compliance
doctrine93 and (2) the harmless error rule.94

See Langbein, supra note 1, at 511.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 statutory notes 3–7 (1999).
89
See Fellows, supra note 78, at 615–16.
90
See supra notes 32–52 and accompanying text.
91
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008).
92
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997); Langbein, supra note 6, at
4–5 (“The proponents of a defectively executed will should be allowed to prove what
they are now entitled to presume in cases of due execution—that the will expresses
the decedent’s testamentary intent.”).
93
See generally Langbein, supra note 1.
94
See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503; Langbein, supra note 6.
87
88
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The substantial compliance doctrine was proposed by
Langbein, who believed that it would relieve some of the
harshness of the strict compliance requirement.95 Pursuant to
this judicially implemented curative doctrine,96 the court
validates a formally deficient will if it is convinced that the
testator intended to execute a will and the testator’s method of
expressing
testamentary
intent
substantially
fulfills
testamentary formality’s functions.97 Put succinctly, Langbein’s
proposal requires the court to address two issues: first, whether
the decedent intended to execute a will, and second, whether the
will’s form adequately serves the purposes of will formalities.98 If
these two issues are resolved in the affirmative, the court will
validate the will, even though the testator did not strictly
comply.99 Although it initially garnered support within the legal
academy, the doctrine has achieved little success, as only a small
number of courts have dabbled with substantial compliance.100
Unhappy with the judicial application of the substantial
compliance analysis, Langbein abandoned his support of the
doctrine and instead backed the adoption of the harmless error
rule.101 In contrast to the substantial compliance doctrine, the
harmless error rule is a legislatively prescribed relaxed formal
compliance standard.102 Pursuant to this rule, the court focuses
on testamentary intent.103 If the proponent of the will convinces
the court by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended to execute a will, the court will not invalidate the will
for lack of formal compliance.104
Unlike the substantial
compliance doctrine, the harmless error analysis contains no
second prong; fulfillment of formality’s functions is not an
independent requirement.105 Both the UPC and the Restatement
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1.
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 6.
97
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 515.
98
See id. at 515–16.
99
See id.
100
See Lester, supra note 7, at 601–02 (explaining that “there are . . . few[] clear
cases involving substantial compliance”).
101
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 6–7; see also Lester, supra note 7, at 581. The
harmless error rule is sometimes referred to as the dispensing power. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 1997).
102
See Lester, supra note 7, at 579–80.
103
See id. at 580.
104
See id.
105
See id.
95
96
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(Third) of Property have adopted the harmless error rule.106
However, this reform effort has had little success, as only ten
states have abandoned strict compliance.107
By placing greater emphasis on testamentary intent, both
the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless error rule
reduce the importance of formal compliance on the validity of a
will. For example, if the court in Pavlinko had applied the
harmless error rule, Hellen and Vasil’s testamentary wishes
likely would have been fulfilled because the couple left behind
such strong evidence of their intent to execute wills. Indeed, no
doubt existed as to what Vasil wanted, and there was no question
that the formal defect was the product of a simple mistake. The
application of the harmless error rule in the Pavlinko case
therefore likely would have resulted in the validity of Vasil’s
will.108 Whether Vasil’s will would have been valid under the
substantial compliance doctrine is less clear because, although
Vasil clearly intended to execute a will, the court would still have
to determine whether Vasil’s signing of his wife’s will constituted
substantial compliance.109 Nonetheless, both the substantial
compliance doctrine and the harmless error rule leave open the
possibility that a formally deficient will can be valid. As such,
both reduce the harsh formalism of the strict compliance
requirement.

106
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999).
107
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 184 (explaining that a version
of the harmless error rule has been adopted in California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia).
108
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (“The main circumstance in which the
South Australian courts have excused signature errors has been in the recurrent
class of cases in which two wills are prepared for simultaneous execution by two
testators, typically husband and wife, and each mistakenly signs the will prepared
for the other.”).
109
See Allen v. Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 249–50 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Langbein,
supra note 1, at 518) (“[E]ven proponents of the substantial compliance doctrine to
cure the results of defective execution have not suggested that the more
‘fundamental’ formalities for valid execution of a will, such as a signature, are
dispensable. As noted by a prominent legal commentator, ‘[S]ignature is still the
most fundamental of the Wills Act formalities. . . . The substantial compliance
doctrine would virtually always follow present law in holding that an unsigned will
is no will; a will with the testator’s signature omitted does not comply substantially
with the Wills Act . . . .” (alteration in original)).
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II. THE FUNCTIONS OF WILL FORMALITIES
Before one can undertake a functional analysis of strict
compliance and examine the resulting implications for the law of
wills, a clear understanding of the functions of will formalities
must be established. This Part therefore provides a functional
analysis of testamentary formality. Although this analysis draws
heavily from Langbein, it also provides new insights into the
functions of will formalities and lays the foundation for the
separation of formality’s functions from those of strict
compliance.
Despite the widespread reliance upon the traditional
functional analysis of testamentary formality, formulating a
clear picture of the functions of will formalities is not as simple
as summarizing Langbein. For instance, Langbein’s analysis
blurs the distinction between the purposes of formality and the
purposes of strict compliance.
Consider, for example, the
traditional articulation of testamentary formality’s channeling
function.
As one commentator explains, the formalities
“provide[] a legal framework upon which testators can model
their actions,” and “[t]he existence of this framework tends to
make testamentary documents more uniform, which eases the
administrative burden on the probate courts.”110
This description of the channeling function contains two
separate ideas. The first is a function of formality and relates to
the benefit that an individual testator receives from the
formalities of will-execution. Specifically, compliance with the
prescribed formalities provides the testator a method of
effectively communicating testamentary intent to the court.111
The second is a function of strict compliance and relates to the
benefit derived from a requirement that all testators comply with
the prescribed formalities. Namely, because all wills must be in
substantially the same form, the court can more easily and
efficiently distinguish a will from a non-testamentary
document.112

110
Kelly A. Hardin, Note, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and
the Need for a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145,
1153 (1993).
111
See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801
(1941).
112
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494.
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The traditional functional analysis of will formalities
therefore touts administrative efficiency as a benefit of
testamentary formality’s channeling function. However, this
benefit is properly understood as a function of the strict
compliance requirement. The court is able to easily identify valid
wills not because an individual testator complies with the
prescribed formalities, but because all testators comply with
them.113
Thus, traditional functional analysis implicitly
recognizes that the rule of strict compliance serves functions
similar to those of the formalities themselves, but it does not
explicitly differentiate the two sets of functions.
Adding to this murkiness regarding the functions of
testamentary formality is the failure of legal scholars to
reevaluate Langbein’s functional analysis.114
Functionalists
typically rely exclusively upon his articulations of formality’s
functions.115 However, nearly four decades of dependence upon
Langbein has gradually produced misunderstanding and
oversimplification regarding the functional analysis of
testamentary formality.116
Therefore, not only does past
scholarship conflate the functions of will formalities with those of
strict compliance, but legal scholars also unflaggingly rely on
Langbein’s functional analysis.
Both issues present an
opportunity for refinement of the traditional evidentiary,
protective, channeling, and cautionary functions.
A.

The Evidentiary Function

The traditional functional analysis of testamentary formality
suggests that will formalities serve functions that ensure
fulfillment of testamentary intent.117 No function fulfills this
See Bonfield, supra note 58, at 1907.
See Miller, supra note 71, at 255 n.473. But see Baron, supra note 60, at 172–
79 (questioning the assumptions underlying the functional analysis of testamentary
formality).
115
See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Guttenberg
Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 121–22
(2008); Lindgren, supra note 75, at 544.
116
See, e.g., Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of
Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 54 n.141 (2006) (confusing the ritual
function with the channeling function); David K. Johns, Will Execution Ceremonies:
Securing a Client’s Last Wishes, 23 COLO. LAW. 47, 48 (1994) (erroneously describing
the four functions of will formalities as the ritual, cautionary, protective, and
channeling functions).
117
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 492.
113
114
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purpose more than the evidentiary function.118 During the
administration of the testator’s estate, certain evidentiary
difficulties arise because the validity of a will is often determined
long after it is executed.119 At the time of probate, the testator is
almost invariably dead,120 and in such situations the testator
cannot testify regarding testamentary intent.121 Additionally,
because the testator often makes notes and rough drafts in
advance of executing a will,122 questions sometimes arise
regarding whether a particular document was intended to be a
final expression of testamentary intent or was merely a
preparatory writing.123
These unique circumstances, which result from the years
and sometimes decades that intervene between the execution of a
will and the administration of an estate, can lead to insufficient
and unreliable evidence of testamentary intent.124 Testamentary
formality, however, alleviates some of these evidentiary
difficulties.125 By executing a written, signed, and attested
document, the testator leaves behind “evidence of testamentary
intent . . . in reliable and permanent form.”126 This consequence
of formality is perhaps best exemplified by the writing

See Fuller, supra note 111, at 800; Langbein, supra note 1, at 492; Charles I.
Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the
Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 348, 351 (1979).
119
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6.
120
Although probate typically occurs after the testator’s death, statutes in five
states now allow probate proceedings to occur during the testator’s life. See
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 312 (identifying Alaska, Arkansas,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Ohio as states authorizing antemortem probate).
121
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6.
122
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1065
(1996) (“[M]any persons are given to speak and write off the cuff, many persons
commit to words tentative drafts of their wills and then have second thoughts when
the time for inking draws near.”).
123
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494–95 (explaining that “the danger exists
that
[the
testator]
may
make
seeming
testamentary
dispositions . . . without . . . finality of intention” and observing that “[n]ot every
expression that ‘I want you to have the house when I’m gone’ is meant as a will.”).
124
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6; see Langbein, supra note 1, at 492–93.
125
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494–95.
126
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6; see also Langbein, supra note 1, at
492–93.
118
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requirement, which forecloses the possibility of an oral will and
therefore eliminates the obvious evidentiary problems that
accompany non-written forms of testamentary expression.127
Unlike a written will, an oral testamentary disposition is
susceptible to the unreliability of witness accounts, which are
subject to “lapse[s] of memory, misinterpretation[,] . . . and the
more or less unconscious coloring of recollection in the light
of . . . personal interest.”128 By contrast, a written document
provides clearer and more permanent evidence of the substance
of the testator’s will and consequently is more reliable than an
oral testamentary disposition.129 Moreover, if the testator merely
leaves behind the testimony of a witness, not only would the
substantive provisions of the will be questionably evidenced, but
the testator’s intent to execute a will at all would also be in
doubt.130 Either by mistake or in furtherance of fraud, a witness
could produce evidence of a will that the decedent did not
execute.131 However, by requiring the testator to leave behind a
tangible manifestation of testamentary intent, the writing
requirement both produces a more reliable expression of the
will’s terms and provides stronger evidence of the testator’s
intent to execute a will.
The signature requirement also contributes to the
evidentiary function of testamentary formality.132 By requiring
that testators affix their names to their wills, the signature
requirement provides evidence of the will's author.133 The
signature formality fulfills this evidentiary purpose not only by
simply mandating that the testator’s name appear on the
document but also by providing a handwriting sample that can

127
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6–7 (“A written statement of
intention may be ambiguous, but, if it is genuine and can be produced, it has the
advantage of preserving in permanent form the language chosen by the testator to
show his intent.”).
128
Id. at 4; see also Baron, supra note 60, at 170 (“Reliable objective evidence is
needed because those who survive the donor cannot be trusted to recount faithfully
or truly what the donor said and did.”).
129
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 492–93.
130
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 3.
131
See Miller, supra note 71, at 246 (explaining that “hardship and
fraud . . . doubtless would be a consequence of permitting parties or interested
persons to testify as to intent and authenticity” of an oral will).
132
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 7; Langbein, supra note 1, at 492–93.
133
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 7; Langbein, supra note 1, at 493.
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be analyzed to authenticate the document.134 In addition to the
writing and signature requirements, the attestation formality
provides evidence of testamentary intent.135 This requirement
introduces witnesses into the testamentary experience, who may
be able to testify during probate proceedings regarding the
legitimacy of the will-execution process.136 Because of the lag
between the execution of a will and probate, the witnesses of the
ceremony may have fading memories or may be missing,
incompetent, or deceased.137 Nonetheless, the requirement at
least presents the possibility that a reliable firsthand account of
the will-execution process will be available at the time of
probate.138
In addition to the genuineness of testamentary intent,
another issue raised by the evidentiary difficulties of probate is
distinguishing final expressions of testamentary intent from
mere preliminary notes or rough drafts.139
Making this
distinction may be problematic because the testator cannot
testify during probate. One purpose of will formalities is to
alleviate this difficulty by providing evidence of the finality of
testamentary intent.140 Formalities remind testators of the
importance and legal significance of their actions.141 As Langbein
134
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 7 (“The possibility of a forged
signature must be controlled by the abilities of handwriting experts.”). The
evidentiary value of the signature requirement is diminished by “the typical
statutory authorization of a signature made by another for the testator, and the
generally recognized rule that the testator’s signature need not be his correct name.”
Id. (footnote omitted). However, both of these situations “are probably quite rare in
view of the usual custom in a literate era of signing documents with a complete
name.” Id.
135
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 493.
136
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 8.
137
See id.
138
See id. Even “if the witnesses are dead or cannot be located or have moved
far away[,] . . . a self-proving affidavit reciting that all the requirements of due
execution have been complied with” can be prepared and will provide evidence of
testamentary intent. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 169–70 (emphasis
removed).
139
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
140
As Langbein explains, “Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for a
witnessed will is meant to conclude the question of testamentary intent.” Langbein,
supra note 1, at 495. For example, “[t]he signature tends to show that the
instrument was finally adopted by the testator as his will and to militate against the
inference that the writing was merely a preliminary draft, an incomplete disposition,
or haphazard scribbling.” Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
141
See Fuller, supra note 111, at 800; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5–6;
Langbein, supra note 1, at 494–95.
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explains, “It is difficult to complete the [will-execution] ceremony
and remain ignorant that one is making a will.”142 Accordingly,
compliance with the formalities provides evidence that a formally
executed will represents the decedent’s definitive expression of
testamentary intent.143
B.

The Protective Function

In addition to serving an evidentiary function,144 will
formalities also protect testators from situations that threaten to
This purpose of
undermine their testamentary intent.145
formality is labeled the protective function.146
During the
preparation of an estate plan and the execution of a will, the
testator may be susceptible to various forms of imposition
perpetrated by those who intend to benefit dishonestly from the
will.147
By mandating that the testator comply with the
formalities of will-execution, the law provides the testator some
protection from these scenarios, including protection from the
possibility of fraud, duress, and undue influence at the time of
will-execution.148
Will formalities protect the testator in a variety of ways. For
example, by requiring that a will be written, will formalities
reduce the potential for fraud that is inherent with an oral will,
which leaves behind potentially unreliable evidence of
testamentary intent.149 Furthermore, the presence of witnesses
reduces the possibility that the testator will be overcome by
duress or undue influence at the time of will-execution.150 The
Langbein, supra note 1, at 495.
See Miller, supra note 71, at 260–62.
144
See supra Part II.A.
145
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9–13; Langbein, supra note 1, at
496–97.
146
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9.
147
See id. at 9 (“Some of the requirements of the statutes of wills have the
objective, according to judicial interpretation, of protecting the testator against
imposition at the time of execution.”).
148
See Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills
and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 66 n.139 (2008).
149
See Miller, supra note 71, at 274 (explaining that “[t]he Statute of Frauds of
1677 substantially decreased the number of fraudulent wills because it required
testators to reduce testamentary dispositions to writing.”); see also supra notes 127–
31 and accompanying text.
150
See Nelson & Starck, supra note 118, at 352 (“Functionally, the presence of
multiple parties acts as a check against imposition by third parties and by parties
present at the signing of the will.”).
142
143
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attesting witnesses can defend the testator against third parties
who may attempt to interfere with the will-execution process,
and the requirement of multiple witnesses can protect the
testator from the fraudulent behavior of one attesting witness.
This protective quality is further bolstered by the requirement
that witnesses be disinterested,151 a requirement which
eliminates those who stand to benefit from fraud or undue
influence from the pool of potential witnesses.152
In addition to fraud, duress, and undue influence at the time
of will-execution, other scenarios involving fraud occur at the
time of probate.153
These include both the “fraudulent
suppression of a valid will after the testator dies”154 and the
fraudulent admission of a will that the testator never executed.155
However, just as will formalities protect against fraud at the
time of will-execution, they also serve a protective function at the
time of probate. For instance, by providing such strong evidence
that the testator intended to execute a valid will,156 formalities
make it difficult for contestants to argue that a duly executed
will does not represent a genuine expression of testamentary
intent.157 Furthermore, by requiring the testator’s signature and
attestation by witnesses, will formalities increase the difficulty of
forging a will that can pass through the probate process
undetected.158 The protective function therefore encompasses the
purposes of both protecting the testator from imposition at the
time of will-execution and preventing fraud at the time of
probate.

151

496.

See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 11–12; Langbein, supra note 1, at

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 166–67.
See Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and
Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 558 (2005) (“The formalities help guard
against a person’s being defrauded or unduly influenced into accepting a disposition
she does not really want to make.”).
154
STEWART E. STERK ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 228 (4th ed. 2011).
155
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
156
See supra Part II.A.
157
See Miller, supra note 71, at 276 (“In most instances, . . . the existence of a
duly executed and attested will effectively resolves the issue of a testamentary
intent.”).
158
For example, by requiring a written document, formality eliminates the
ability of wrongdoers to submit fraudulent evidence of an oral will. See supra notes
128–31 and accompanying text.
152
153
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The Signaling Function

The third function of testamentary formality is the signaling
function. Under Langbein’s traditional functional analysis, this
function is described as part of formality’s channeling function.159
However, as explained previously, the two functions are
distinct.160 Whereas the channeling function is a function of the
strict compliance requirement, the signaling function is a
function of testamentary formality.161 With the discussion of the
strict compliance requirement’s channeling function reserved for
a later Section,162 this Section focuses on formality’s signaling
function, which provides testators with a method of effectively
communicating their intent to execute a will.163
The hallmark of the law of wills is the principle that
testators have broad freedom to leave their property to whomever
they choose.164 Despite its fundamental status, testamentary
freedom could be undermined if the law did not provide the
testator a means to definitively convey testamentary intent. As
Langbein explains, without a prescribed method of
communicating testamentary intent, “the testator would be left
to grope for his own means of persuading the probate court that

159
See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 110, at 1153; Langbein, supra note 1, at 493–94;
Miller, supra note 71, at 269, 271; Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation
and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 155, 178–79 (2008).
160
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
161
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
162
See infra Part III.C.
163
See Fuller, supra note 111, at 801 (“[F]orm offers a legal framework into
which the party may fit his actions, or, to change the figure, it offers channels for the
legally effective expression of intention.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 493.
164
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. b (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the
meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention.”); Langbein, supra note 1,
at 491 (“The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation”). In addition to
allowing the testator to dispose of the estate as the testator desires, testamentary
freedom may also be therapeutic for the testator. See Mark Glover, A Therapeutic
Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 444–46
(2012).
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his intentions were final and volitional.”165 Because of the
evidentiary difficulties of probate,166 the task of signaling intent
to execute a will could be difficult.167
Recognizing the potentially troublesome consequences of
these evidentiary difficulties, will formalities provide testators
the language by which they can unequivocally communicate
testamentary intent.168
The testator’s compliance with the
prescribed will-execution process leaves little doubt regarding
testamentary intent, and thus all documents that satisfy the
formalities of will-execution are presumed to express
testamentary intent.169 In this regard, will formalities form a
safe harbor for the exercise of testamentary freedom.170 When
testators communicate testamentary intent through a written,
signed, and attested document, they have assurance that the
court will recognize their expression of testamentary intent as
legally valid.171
This idea that formality is a method to effectively
communicate intent to enter legal transactions stems from the
scholarship of Professor Lon Fuller, who explains that formality
“serves . . . to mark or signalize the enforceable promise [and]
furnishes a simple and external test of enforceability.”172 In other
165
Langbein, supra note 6, at 4; see Fuller, supra note 111, at 802 (explaining
that “[o]ne planning to enter a legal transaction faces a . . . problem” because “[h]is
mind first conceives an economic or sentimental objective” and “[h]e must
then . . . cast about for the legal transaction . . . which will most nearly accomplish
these objectives”).
166
See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
167
James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1992)
(“In a system without the safe harbor of a will, a testator might have to go to
extraordinary lengths to ensure that her wishes were followed after her death.”).
168
See Fuller, supra note 111, at 801–02 (drawing an analogy between formality
and language).
169
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 514–15; J. G. Miller, Substantial Compliance
and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 564–65 (1987); see also John
H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 541–42
(1982).
170
See Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U.
KAN. L. REV. 139, 150–52 (2012); Langbein, supra note 6, at 4.
171
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 4 (“The greatest blessing of the Wills Act
formalities is the safe harbor that they create” because “[t]he testator who complies
with [them] assures his estate of routine probate in all but exceptional
circumstances.”); Lindgren, supra note 167, at 1031 (“One of the positive effects of
formalism is that known acts produce known results. Formalities bring consistency
and protection against arbitrariness.”).
172
Fuller, supra note 111, at 801.
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words, formalities provide those who wish to enter into a legally
enforceable transaction, such as a contract or a gift, a clear route
of effectuating the intent to enter the transaction.173 In making
this argument, Fuller writes about legal formalities generally,
but as recognized by Langbein and subsequent scholars,174 this
function is a consequence not only of contract formalities and the
formal requirements of gifts, but also of will formalities.
D. The Cautionary Function
The fourth function of testamentary formality is known by
several names, the most common of which are the cautionary
function175 and the ritual function.176 Some scholars also refer to
this function as the ceremonial function177 or the deterrent
function.178 This function is intended to impress upon the
testator the importance and legal significance of the willexecution process, thereby encouraging the testator to complete
the process after careful planning and with a circumspect state of
mind.179 By fulfilling their cautionary function, will formalities
help ensure that the will reflects the decedent’s considered and
reasoned intent.180
Will formalities serve this cautionary function by providing
the will-execution process a “general ceremonial” quality.181 The
ceremony distinguishes the testamentary experience from the
routine tasks of daily life and “precludes the possibility that the
testator was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion.”182 Each
formality contributes to this ceremonial quality in a distinct way.
See id.
See supra note 159.
175
See, e.g., Grant, supra note 115, at 121–22; Langbein, supra note 1, at 494;
Sherwin, supra note 72, at 456.
176
See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 58, at 1907; Clowney, supra note 148, at 66
n.139; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5.
177
See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, The Evanescence of Living Wills, 24 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 141, 162 (1989); Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal
Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 411, 439 (2009); Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of
Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 159 n.7 (1988).
178
See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 111, at 800.
179
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494–95; Miller, supra note 71, at 261–62.
180
See Miller, supra note 71, at 261–62 (“A secondary aspect of formality is its
tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator. Formality
thus prevents enforcement of casual statements and unpremeditated action . . . .”).
181
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 5.
182
Id.
173
174
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First, the writing requirement serves the cautionary function by
preventing the execution of a will through a careless oral
expression of testamentary intent.183 Because “[w]riting has
always been regarded as the most solemn form of expression,”184
testators more likely approach the execution of a written will
with greater aforethought than they would the execution of an
oral will.185 Second, one’s signature has traditionally indicated
authenticity and finality of intent, and therefore the signature
requirement also reminds the testator of the importance of willexecution.186
Finally, by introducing outsiders into the
testamentary experience, the formality of attestation sets the
execution of a will apart from ordinary transactions.187
Whereas the individual formalities remind the testator of the
importance and legal significance of the testamentary act, the
will-execution ceremony’s general level of formality also
contributes to the cautionary function.188 By prescribing a
process that the testator must complete to execute a will, thereby
preventing the immediate exercise of testamentary power,
testamentary formality provides the testator time to reflect on
the task at hand. Indeed, by requiring testators to prepare a
written document, to locate attesting witnesses, and to

183
See Fuller, supra note 111, at 800 (explaining that the requirement of
writing “induc[es] [a] circumspective frame of mind”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 495
(“The requirement[] of writing . . . [is a] primary cautionary formalit[y]. Writing is
somewhat less casual than plain chatter. As we say in a common figure of speech,
‘talk is cheap.’ ”).
184
Nelson & Starck, supra note 118, at 349; see Gulliver & Tilson, supra note
10, at 14 (“[T]here is a certain ritual value in writing out [a] document . . . .”);
Langbein, supra note 1, at 519 (explaining that “[a]lthough some modes of electronic
communication can perform some of the functions of writing[,] . . . they lack the
solemnity and finality of a signed document”).
185
Nelson & Starck, supra note 118, at 349.
186
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 3 (“Signature . . . caution[s] the testator about
the seriousness and finality of his act.”). Langbein argues that the “growing use of
signature in routine petty transactions has reduced its cautionary value.” Langbein,
supra note 1, at 518. “However, it could be argued that the routine use of signature
as an implementing act in ordinary business transactions may enhance its ‘ritual’
impact, because the omission of a signature from a document produces an inference
of a lack of finality of intention.” Miller, supra note 71, at 265.
187
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 521. Ancillary will formalities, such as the
subscription and publication requirements, also contribute in various ways to the
ceremonial nature of will-execution. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 6.
However, as Langbein explains, they do so only “incremental[ly].” Langbein, supra
note 1, at 521.
188
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 497–98.
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coordinate the execution ceremony, will formalities not only
remind testators of the importance of making thoughtful
decisions but also provide them time to step back, consider their
goals, and develop a plan that best achieves those objectives.
Will formalities therefore both caution testators and allow them
to react to that cautioning.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
As Part II illustrates, the functional analysis of
testamentary formality entails identifying the purposes served
by an individual testator’s compliance with the prescribed
formalities. The relevant issues are the costs and benefits of
formality. For example, a functional analysis of will formalities
is concerned with whether attestation provides reliable evidence
of testamentary intent189 or whether the disinterested witness
requirement protects the testator from fraud and undue
influence.190 This focus on the purpose of formality is evident in
the analysis of Gulliver and Tilson, when they assert that “any
[formal] requirement of transfer should have a clearly
demonstrable affirmative value.”191 Their focus, as well as that of
subsequent scholars, is the purpose of will formalities and the
identification of the functions served by an individual testator’s
compliance with those formalities.
By contrast, a functional analysis of strict compliance is
concerned with the purposes served by a requirement that all
testators comply with the prescribed formalities. The relevant
issue is not what functions are served by an individual testator’s
compliance with the formalities, but is instead what goals are
achieved by a rule that requires strict compliance from all who
wish to execute wills.
Although scholars generally have
overlooked this distinction, at least one has identified the
relevant issue. Writing in the context of contract formalities,
Professor Eric Posner suggests that “[a]lthough [a functional
analysis] may explain why parties would often want to use a

189
190
191

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9.
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not explain
Referring to

[P]arties could send . . . a signal by simply stating orally
whether they desire legal enforcement or not. If they want to
increase the likelihood of the result they desire, they might
write it down. But there is no reason that the use of a writing
should necessarily count as a signal.193

In this critique of contract formalities, Posner draws upon
the distinction between formality and strict compliance. He
notes that there might be good reason for contracting parties to
fulfill some formal requirements, but he also raises doubts as to
why all contracting parties must follow the same formal
process.194 Ultimately, he concludes by asserting that traditional
functional analysis “fail[s] because [it] do[es] not explain why
parties are forbidden to bargain around [the] formalities.”195 Put
differently, Posner’s concern with traditional functional analysis
is that it does not explain why everyone must comply with the
prescribed formalities, and therefore it does not explain the law’s
insistence on strict compliance.
Although Posner primarily is concerned with contract
formalities, his insight is relevant to the study of will formalities.
Indeed, Langbein expresses concerns about will formalities
similar to Posner’s concerns regarding contract formalities: “The
puzzle about the Wills Act formalities is not why we have them,
but why we enforce them so stringently.”196 This Part addresses
192
Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1983–84 (1996).
193
Id. at 1984. Posner makes similar observations regarding the other functions
of formality. For example, concerning the protective function he writes:
[I]t does not explain why the law should require promisees to protect
themselves . . . . If the promisee wants the additional protection of a
writing, he can insist on it. But if drafting costs exceed the value of
additional protection, he should not be required by an immutable rule to
agree to a writing.
Id. at 1985.
194
See id. at 1981–86.
195
Id. at 1986.
196
Langbein, supra note 6, at 3; see Langbein, supra note 1, at 501 (“The ‘chief
justification’ for the Wills Act formalities . . . is that the testator must inevitably be
unavailable at the time of litigation to authenticate or clarify his intention. This
factor justifies the formalities; the present question is whether it justifies formalism,
that is, whether it also mandates the rule of literal compliance with the formalities.”
(footnote omitted)).
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this question by presenting four functions of the strict compliance
requirement, which include the clarifying function, the deterrent
function, the channeling function, and the impediment function.
By separating these functions of strict compliance from the
functional analysis of will formalities, this Part explains why all
testators are required to comply with the formalities of willexecution.
A.

The Clarifying Function

The clarifying function of strict compliance is the analogue to
the evidentiary function of will formalities.197 The evidentiary
function encompasses the idea that, by executing a written,
signed, and attested will, the testator leaves behind reliable
evidence of testamentary intent.198 By contrast, the clarifying
function suggests that because all testators must comply with the
prescribed formalities, an individual testator is more likely to
behave in a way that produces reliable evidence of testamentary
intent.199 Strict compliance serves this function by incentivizing
the testator to prepare for the execution of a will, an incentive
that manifests itself in a variety of ways.
First, by requiring all testators to complete the formal willexecution process, the rule of strict compliance encourages those
who desire to distribute their property through wills to comply
with the prescribed will-execution formalities.200 As discussed
previously, a testator’s compliance with the formalities produces
reliable evidence of testamentary intent, and a written, signed,
and attested document robustly signals the testator’s intent to
execute a will.201 Strict compliance therefore serves its clarifying
function by prompting the testator to precisely follow the

197
The clarifying function of strict compliance was inspired by Professor Joseph
Perillo’s discussion of contract formalities. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of
Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
39, 56–58 (1974).
198
See supra Part II.A.
199
Perillo, supra note 197, at 56–57.
200
See Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1065–66 (“[T]he very fact that the law
demands formalities should function ex ante to encourage proper execution and
hence yield, in more instances, better evidence both of the substance of the estate
plan and of the testator’s resolve to put it into legal effect.”).
201
See supra Part II.A.
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mandates of testamentary formality. Consequently, the benefits
of formality’s evidentiary function are realized and little doubt is
left regarding testamentary intent.
Second, the strict compliance requirement incentivizes the
consultation of an estate planning lawyer, who can assist the
testator with the preparation of an estate plan and the execution
of a will.202 Although a testator may seek legal advice for various
reasons, including to prevent probate litigation and to minimize
estate taxes,203 the strict compliance requirement encourages the
testator to consult an attorney to ensure compliance with the
formal requirements of will-execution.204 Because testamentary
formality contributes a level of technical complexity to the
execution of a will, the will-execution process “provides [the
testator] a fertile field for error.”205 When this possibility of
formal deficiency is coupled with a rule of strict compliance, the
testator has a strong incentive to engage an estate planning
attorney who can safely navigate the formalities of willexecution.206
The estate planning attorney in turn provides clarity to the
testator’s expression of intent. For example, the lawyer ensures
compliance with the prescribed formalities.207 Moreover, the
estate planning attorney is equipped with the knowledge and
expertise to draft a will that clearly and precisely reflects the
testator’s intent.208 Testators will not be left to draft the
See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 367–68; Hirsch, supra note
122, at 1067 n.31 (“[T]he intervention of attorneys” in the will-execution process,
“though not mandatory, is encouraged simply by the requirement that testators
fulfill the technical formalities.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 494 n.26.
203
See Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money: Mediation
Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 551–54 (2008).
204
See Friedman, supra note 202, at 367–68.
205
Gerry W. Beyer, Avoiding the Estate Planning “Blue Screen of Death”—
Common Non-Tax Errors and How To Prevent Them, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 61, 93 (2008).
206
See Gregory S. Alexander, Essay, Demythologizing Property and the Illusion
of Rules: A Response to Two Friendly Critics, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2007)
(“The rules prescribing formalities for execution of wills . . . traditionally have been
hard-edged . . . . It is easy for the lay person to get tripped up by them, making it
strongly advisable for people to have lawyers prepare their wills.”).
207
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 524.
208
See STERK ET AL., supra note 154, at 228 (“[T]he mysteries created by the
formalities channel testators to lawyers, who are trained in helping people think
about their property, preparing wills, presiding over their execution, storing them,
etc.”); Friedman, supra note 202, at 368 (explaining that formalities “encourage the
202
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complicated provisions of their wills, and the testamentary
document will more clearly convey both testators’ intent to
execute a will and the substance of their chosen estate plan.
Finally, the strict compliance requirement serves a clarifying
function by encouraging the testator to execute a will earlier in
life. A requirement of strict compliance provides an incentive for
the testator to actively prepare for the exercise of testamentary
power because compliance with the technicalities of willexecution can be both difficult and time-consuming.209 As a
result, testators are more likely to undertake the will-execution
process while young and in good health, rather than on their
deathbeds.210 At such time, testators will more likely be able to
clearly convey their testamentary preferences and will not be
riddled with the plights of sickness and old age that can diminish
their ability to effectively communicate their testamentary
intent.
In sum, by incentivizing the testator to undertake steps that
clarify and evidence the testator’s intent, the requirement of
strict compliance serves a clarifying function. By invalidating all
formally defective documents, the rule of strict compliance
prompts the testator to carefully and precisely comply with the
prescribed formalities. This incentive bolsters testamentary
formality’s evidentiary function and induces testators to plainly
convey their intent. Moreover, by making the execution of a will
burdensome, the strict compliance requirement encourages the
testator to seek the aid of an estate planning attorney and to
prepare for the execution of a will early in life, both of which
increase the likelihood that the testator will clearly communicate
testamentary preferences. By contrast, if the strict compliance
use of middlemen (lawyers) who can help plan a rational, trouble-free disposition of
assets”); Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1067 n.31 (“[F]ormalities tend to funnel the
substance of estate plans into standardized, efficiently interpreted lines of
expression, owing to the intervention of attorneys whose participation, though not
mandatory, is encouraged simply by the requirement that testators fulfill the
technical formalities.”); Schenkel, supra note 159, at 179 (“By channeling the
testator to a will, we also usually channel the testator to a lawyer, and hopefully to a
lawyer who has the general competence and specific expertise to draft a will that
carries out the testator’s wishes.”).
209
See Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1065 n.28 (“[K]knowledge that a will must be
elaborately formalized may serve ex ante to discourage procrastination resulting in
‘deathbed wills,’ common before formalities were required in England, and
notoriously poorly planned.”).
210
See id.
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requirement were abandoned and all formally deficient wills
were not necessarily invalid, then the testator’s incentive to
behave in these ways would be diminished because the cost of a
formal defect would be reduced.211
B.

The Deterrent Function

The deterrent function of strict compliance corresponds to
the protective function of testamentary formality. By satisfying
the formal requirements of valid will-execution, an individual
testator places protective measures within a testamentary
document that are designed to prevent fraud.212 For example, by
executing a will in the presence of disinterested witnesses who
can later testify regarding the execution process, the testator
provides protection against fraudulent claims that the testator
did not intend the document to be a will.213 Likewise, by putting
a testamentary scheme in writing and signing the document, the
testator places protective barriers against the potential
fraudulent suppression of a valid will.214
By contrast, the deterrent function refers to the disincentive
that a requirement of strict compliance creates for attempted
fraud.215 If prospective wrongdoers know that a document that
does not strictly comply with the prescribed formalities is invalid,
they will have less of an incentive to attempt fraud.216 By
211
Langbein acknowledges that the potential loss of this aspect of the clarifying
function is a potential cost of relaxing the law’s insistence on strict compliance,
although he ultimately concludes that the incentive to comply would remain under a
relaxed formal compliance standard. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 524 (“[T]he
substantial compliance doctrine would have no effect whatever upon primary
conduct. The incentive for due execution would remain.”).
212
See supra Part II.B.
213
See supra Part II.B.
214
See supra Part II.B.
215
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 12; Sherwin, supra note 72, at 456
(explaining that “the requirement that the testator sign the will serves . . . the
protective function by deterring forgery”).
216
See id. at 12–13. Gulliver and Tilson question the effectiveness of the
deterrent function based largely upon their belief that potential wrongdoers do not
know the formal requirements of will-execution. As they argue, “The deterrent effect
of any penalty depends on the extent to which it is generally known to exist. It is
extremely improbable that laymen would be aware of the legal rules concerning the
competency of attesting witnesses without legal advice . . . .” Id. at 12. However, it
seems safe to assume that most people understand that the execution of wills
requires some form of special procedure. Potential wrongdoers therefore likely know
that some formality is required. Moreover, a general awareness of the need for
special procedures combined with ignorance of the specific requirements may serve
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requiring that all testators execute a written, signed, and
attested document, the law places obstacles that wrongdoers
must precisely navigate in order to pass a fraudulent will
through the probate system. As a result, they may reconsider
their actions and will be less likely to act on their fraudulent
impulses. Conversely, if wills were valid despite formal defects,
the opportunity for fraud would be greater because the task of
submitting a fraudulent will would be less difficult. The strict
compliance requirement therefore serves a deterrent function
because it provides greater potential for the invalidation of
fraudulent wills and makes attempted fraud more costly.
The notion that formality serves as a deterrent to
prospective fraud is not absent from the traditional functional
analysis of testamentary formality. For instance, although they
question the efficacy of this “deterrent effect,” Gulliver and Tilson
acknowledge that formality may deter wrongdoers as well as
protect testators.217 More recent scholarship also contains hints
of this deterrent function. For example, one trusts and estates
case book explains that “the presence of witnesses . . . make[s]
scoundrels think twice.”218 Although traces of the deterrent
function can be found, traditional functional analysis fails to
explicitly distinguish this deterrent effect from formality’s
protective function. However, while it is similar to formality’s
protective function, the deterrent function is properly understood
as a function of strict compliance.
C.

The Channeling Function

The third function of strict compliance is the channeling
function, which relates to the signaling function of testamentary
formality. Much like how the signaling function reduces the
testator’s difficulty of communicating testamentary intent,219 the
channeling function contributes to the efficiency of the probate
process by easing the court’s burden of identifying testamentary

as a greater deterrent than a potential wrongdoer’s comprehensive knowledge of the
will-execution process.
217
Id. at 12–13.
218
STERK ET AL., supra note 154, at 228; see also Sherwin, supra note 72, at 456
(explaining that formalities “serve a protective function by reducing the possibility
that wrongdoers might interfere with the process of execution”).
219
See supra Part II.C.
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intent.220 A large number of estates pass through the probate
system each year, and consequently, the probate process can be
expensive and time-consuming.221
However, as Langbein
explains, “[c]ompliance with the . . . formalities for executing
witnessed wills results in considerable uniformity in the
organization, language, and content of most wills.”222
This standardization is a product of the strict compliance
requirement, which requires the court to indiscriminately
invalidate all formally deficient documents. By providing courts
a mechanical method of judging the validity of wills based upon
the testator’s compliance with the prescribed formalities, rather
than requiring courts to make individualized determinations of
testamentary intent based upon all available evidence, the
channeling function of strict compliance promotes the efficiency
of the probate system.223 Additionally, by channeling all valid
wills into substantially the same form, the strict compliance
requirement minimizes the court’s discretion in evaluating the
genuineness of wills and consequently increases certainty
regarding which wills are valid and which are not. This
increased certainty suppresses litigation involving informal
wills,224 thereby further diminishing the administrative burdens
of the probate system.

220
See Lindgren, supra note 75, at 544 (“[F]ormalities channel almost all wills
into the same patterns, letting well-counseled testators know what they must do to
execute a valid will, reducing the administrative costs of determining which
documents are wills, and thus increasing the reliability of our system of testation.”);
John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 42, 89 n.232
(2009) (explaining that the channeling “function demands that a document be
recognizable as a will in order to permit routine processing of the steps in probate
administration.”).
221
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 504.
222
Id. at 494; see Friedman, supra note 202, at 368.
223
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494 (explaining that because will formalities
produce uniformity, “[c]ourts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was
meant to be a will” and explaining further that “[t]he court can process [the
testator’s] estate routinely, because his testament is conventionally and
unmistakably expressed and evidenced”).
224
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 37 (“A harmless error rule opens for litigation
an issue of potential difficulty that the traditional strict compliance rule forecloses,
namely, whether to enforce a defectively executed will.”).
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As exemplified by Langbein’s explanation,225 the channeling
function represents a prominent part of traditional functional
analysis in the law of wills.226 Like other aspects of the
functional analysis of strict compliance, scholars have
erroneously identified the channeling function as a function of
will formalities. However, the channeling function is not a
function of testamentary formality, but is instead a function of
the formalism that requires strict compliance with the prescribed
formalities.
Indeed, the channeling function is properly
understood as a consequence of the strict compliance
requirement because its benefits are realized only if many, if not
all, testators are required to comply with the formalities.227
For the purposes of comparison, consider formality’s
signaling function. The benefit of this function is realized every
time an individual testator complies with the prescribed
formalities.228
If individual testators satisfy the formal
requirements of will-execution, they have assurance that they
have effectively communicated testamentary intent to the
probate court and that their testamentary preferences will be
fulfilled.229 The signaling function is therefore a consequence of
testamentary formality because the testator who complies with
the formalities receives the benefit of the function regardless of
whether other testators comply with the formalities.
By contrast, the benefit of the channeling function is realized
only if a large portion of testators are required to comply with the
prescribed formalities. If all testators need not comply with the
prescribed formalities, the efficiency of the probate system is
diminished because the probate court must determine whether
each formally defective document reflects testamentary intent.230
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494.
See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 153, at 558; Lindgren, supra note 75, at
544; Martin, supra note 220, at 89 n.232.
227
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494.
228
See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
229
See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
230
See Bonfield, supra note 58, at 1907 (“If all wills are executed according to a
single pattern, courts will spend less time determining whether a document offered
for probate was really intended by the decedent to be a will rather than some other
writing.”); Leigh A. Shipp, Comment, Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills:
New Choices for Probate Courts in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723, 733 (2005)
(“While compliance with statutory formalities ostensibly increases the speed and
efficiency of the probate process by standardizing the requirements for a valid will,
the adoption of a dispensing power requires an examination on a case-by-case basis
225
226
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Whether an individual testator strictly complies makes no
difference; without the formalism that requires strict compliance
from all testators, any expression of testamentary intent could be
a valid will. As a result, the administrative efficiency produced
by the channeling function is diminished, regardless of how many
testators choose to comply with the prescribed formalities. Thus,
because a requirement that all testators comply with the
prescribed formalities funnels all wills into an easily identifiable
form, the strict compliance requirement serves a channeling
function.
D. The Impediment Function
The final function of the strict compliance requirement is the
impediment function. This function correlates to the cautionary
function of testamentary formality, which impresses upon the
testator the importance of the will-execution process and
encourages careful consideration of the decisions that affect the
testator’s estate plan.231 Similarly, the impediment function of
strict compliance serves as a means of validating only those
attempts to exercise testamentary power that display objective
evidence of the testator’s contemplative state of mind.232 Put
differently, the strict compliance requirement weeds out those
attempts to exercise testamentary power that are more likely
hurried and undertaken with inadequate preparation.233
The law discards deficiently executed wills in this way
because the default distributive scheme of intestacy backstops
the impediment function and distributes the decedent’s estate in
a manner that is believed to represent most testators’ probable
of whether the document offered for probate truly represents the decedent’s
testamentary desires.”). Langbein recognizes that the potential loss of this
channeling function is a potential cost of relaxing the law’s insistence on strict
compliance. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 524 (“The substantial compliance
doctrine must necessarily impair something of the channeling function, because it
permits the proponents of noncomplying instruments to litigate the question of
functional compliance, an issue which the rule of literal compliance presently
forecloses.”).
231
See supra Part II.D.
232
See Glover, supra note 170, at 158.
233
See Sarajane Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic
Anomaly, 67 KY. L.J. 309, 340 (1978) (“By limiting judicial recognition to transfers
which comply with such formalities, the courts reduce the chance of giving legal
import to words carelessly spoken or to idle ruminations about actions to be taken in
the future.”).
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intent. Given this objective, intestacy statutes distribute the
estates of those who die without wills within the family, an
outcome that is traditionally considered socially beneficial.234
Distribution within the decedent’s family was once so greatly
valued that a preference for intestacy was at times made explicit
in both case law and legislative history.235 For example, the
drafters of an early nineteenth century New York statute
explained: “We may safely lean in favor of intestacy; since it
rarely happens that the dispositions of a disputed will are as just
and equitable as those which, in the event of its being set aside,
the law provides.”236 Similarly, the Supreme Court of California
once stated that “[i]n the absence of any will, the law makes a
wise, liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead man’s
estate; so wise, indeed, that the policy of permitting wills at all is
often gravely questioned.”237
Furthering this partiality for
intestacy, the strict compliance requirement provides an obstacle
that the testator must navigate to validly execute a will, and the
requirement therefore discourages the distribution of the
testator’s estate outside the family.238
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 65 (explaining that intestacy
“serves the secondary policy of protecting the economic health of the decedent’s
family”); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 27 (2000) (explaining that “society has decided that intestacy statutes
should benefit and strengthen families”). At one time, intestacy was so preferred
that the law contained a presumption against testacy. See Lindgren, supra note 75,
at 552–53.
235
See Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1066 n.30; Mann, supra note 30, at 1049
(“[O]ne occasionally glimpses a belief that intestacy should have a privileged
status . . . .”).
236
See W.W. Ferrier, Jr., Revival of a Revoked Will, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 265, 267
(1940) (quoting Report of Revisers of N.Y. Statutes of 1827–1828, pt. II, c. VI, § 61,
in 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. (2d ed. 1836) App. 633–634).
237
In re Walker’s Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895); see also Banks v. Sherrod,
52 Ala. 267, 270 (1875) (“The law, and courts of justice, pursuing its spirit and
maxims, have always favored heirs.”); Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 300–01 (1858)
(“Why a desire to favor the wills of testators made in extremis, should exist in this
State, we do not very well understand. Ordinarily, our statute of distribution makes
the fairest disposition of a dead man’s property.”).
238
See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 497, 542 (1977) (“[P]eople normally do not think of the formalities of wills as
a needed protection against disinheritance, yet they clearly are, and undoubtedly are
often used as such.”); Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1066 n.30 (explaining that “a
formalities requirement could reflect . . . a preference for the distributive scheme
mandated by the intestacy statute” and that “[a] formalities requirement effectively
places upon testators who do wish to deviate from the intestacy scheme the onus of
evincing unequivocally their intention to do so”). The impediment function of strict
234
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This idea that formality and strict compliance can impede
undesirable transactions is not absent in the study of legal
formalities, as some legal scholars argue that this impediment
function exists in contexts outside the law of wills.239 For
example, writing about the contract formality of the seal,
Professor Eric Mills Holmes explains:
Formalities not only warn the promisor that he is making a deal
(a wakening of legal consciousness), they also serve other
policies of deterrence. For example, formalities deter legal
enforcement of importune and socially undesirable agreements.
Formalities underwrite our societal unwillingness to give legal
sanction to transactions perceived as suspect or of marginal
value. Formal promises assure that our legal machinery is used
to enforce deliberative intent.240

Similarly, some scholars suggest that will formalities also serve
this purpose.241
Like the clarifying, deterrent, and channeling functions, the
impediment function is not a function of formality but is instead
a function of strict compliance. When individual testators comply
with the formal requirements of will-execution, the cautionary
function is served because they more likely understand the legal
significance of their actions and have time to contemplate the
important decisions that they must make.242 The cautionary
function is therefore a function of formality.243 By contrast, the
impediment function is served only when all testators are
required to comply with the prescribed formalities. If strict
compliance is further illuminated by the relatively informal method of will
revocation available to the testator—while it is difficult to opt out of intestacy, it is
relatively easy to opt back in. See Glover, supra note 177, at 442–53.
239
See Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a
Legal Formality, 29 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 617, 627 (1993) (analyzing contract
formalities); see also Love, supra note 233, at 339–40 (discussing gratuitous transfer
formalities generally).
240
Holmes, supra note 239, at 627.
241
See, e.g., Gaubatz, supra note 238, at 542; Glover, supra note 177, at 431–34;
Hirsch, supra note 122, at 1066 n.30; Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth
Amendment: Ways of Thinking About Unenumerated Rights Inspired by Philip
Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate, 75 MISS. L.J. 495, 519 (2006) (“In the case of a bequest
that wrongly fails, there is a backup mechanism, the law of intestate succession,
which operates to distribute the testator’s estate to the most natural objects of his or
her bounty, but in the case of a bequest wrongly interpreted based on parol evidence,
there is no such backup system. Hence, the incentive in the case of a will is to force
any changes which depart from the standard to be in writing.”).
242
See supra Part II.D.
243
See supra Part II.D.
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compliance were abandoned, testators who are not cautioned by
the requirements of testamentary formality could nonetheless
validly exercise testamentary power.244 However, when all
testators must strictly comply, those wills that do not display
objective evidence of a deliberate and contemplative willexecution process are invariably invalid.
In sum, the functions of strict compliance are distinct from
the function of testamentary formality. Whereas testamentary
formality serves the evidentiary, protective, signaling, and
cautionary functions,245 the strict compliance requirement
furthers four similar yet discrete functions, which include the
clarifying, deterrent, channeling, and impediment functions.
First, the clarifying function provides the testator an incentive to
act in ways that produce a clear expression of testamentary
intent.246 Second, the deterrent function disincentivizes attempts
of fraud by potential wrongdoers.247 Third, the channeling
function ensures that all wills are similarly executed and
promotes the administrative efficiency of the probate system.248
Finally, the impediment function separates expressions of
testamentary intent that reflect objective evidence of careful
planning and consideration from those that do not and
discourages the testator from distributing property outside the
family.249
IV. THE EVALUATION OF FORMAL COMPLIANCE RULES
The uncoupling of the functional analysis of strict
compliance from that of testamentary formality has important
implications for the law of wills. On the one hand, by clarifying
and refining the study of will formalities, the distinction between
the functions of formality and the functions of strict compliance
illuminates the proper analytical role of traditional functional
analysis.
Instead of using the functional analysis of will
formalities as a tool to evaluate reforms of the strict compliance
requirement,250 scholars should use it to examine the utility of
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

See infra Parts IV.B–C.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 514–26.
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the formalities and to identify alternative formalities that better
serve the policy objectives of the law of wills.251 Indeed, the
intuitiveness and simplicity of evaluating reforms of will
formalities in light of their underlying purpose likely has
contributed to the reform movement’s success in this area.
On the other hand, the functional analysis of strict
compliance provides a fresh perspective of the role that the strict
compliance requirement plays in the probate process. More
importantly, it provides a novel framework through which to
evaluate the utility of the strict compliance requirement and to
assess the merits of the proposed reforms that would implement
a rule of relaxed formal compliance. Accordingly, this Section
employs this new functional analysis to examine the traditional
strict compliance requirement,252 Langbein’s substantial
compliance doctrine,253 and the UPC’s harmless error rule.254
A.

The Strict Compliance Requirement

The strict compliance requirement serves four functions: the
clarifying, deterrent, channeling, and impediment functions.255
This functional analysis raises the issue of whether these
functions justify the strict compliance requirement’s place in the
law of wills.
Because the strict compliance requirement
invalidates genuine expressions of testamentary intent, the rule’s
continued place in the law of wills depends upon the utility of the
rule’s functions. By examining the consequences of abandoning
the strict compliance requirement, this Section concludes that
the functions of strict compliance are incongruent with or are
outweighed by other policy considerations in the law of wills.
Moreover, it suggests that the strict compliance requirement
should be replaced by a relaxed formal compliance standard.256

251
See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 75, at 541–43, 568 (arguing for the
abolishment of the attestation requirement); Waggoner, supra note 83, at 84
(analyzing the authorization of notarized wills).
252
See supra Part IV.A.
253
See supra Part IV.B.
254
See supra Part IV.C.
255
See supra Part III.
256
Langbein has suggested a similar framework for evaluating reform. See
Langbein, supra note 1, at 523 (“If the substantial compliance doctrine can do
individual justice only at the price of disorder and uncertainty in the patterns of
transfer and testation, the gain may not be worth the cost.”).
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The first function of strict compliance is the clarifying
function. The strict compliance requirement serves this function
by providing the testator an incentive to act in ways that produce
clear evidence of testamentary intent.257 For example, the strict
compliance requirement encourages the testator to carefully
fulfill all of the formal requirements of will-execution258 and to do
so relatively early in life259 and with the aid of an attorney.260 By
encouraging the testator to execute a will in this way, the law
increases the likelihood that the testator will leave behind clear
evidence of testamentary intent.261 The clarifying function,
however, does not justify the requirement’s place in the law of
wills because the testator likely would act similarly absent a rule
of strict compliance.
For instance, if the law abandoned the strict compliance
requirement, testators would still have a strong inducement to
strictly comply,262 and they would therefore still have incentive to
consult an estate-planning attorney. Under the proposals to
replace the strict compliance requirement with a relaxed formal
compliance standard, a formal defect does not automatically
invalidate a will.263
However, strict compliance is still
advantageous to the testator.264 The court only applies the
substantial compliance doctrine or the harmless error rule to
formally deficient wills.265 If testators strictly comply, they
trigger a presumption of testamentary intent, which a contestant
of the will can overcome only by proving that the decedent did
not intend the will to be legally effective.266 Therefore, if the
strict compliance requirement were replaced, the testator’s
incentive to strictly comply would persist because formal

See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
259
See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
260
See supra notes 202–08 and accompanying text.
261
See supra Part III.A.
262
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 524 (“The incentive for due execution would
remain. Precisely because the substantial compliance doctrine is a rule of litigation,
it would have no place in professional estate planning.”).
263
See infra Part IV.B–C.
264
Langbein, supra note 6, at 23 (explaining the effect of the harmless error rule
and stating that “[n]oncompliance is hardly an enticing option”); see also Langbein,
supra note 1, at 524 (explaining the effect of the substantial compliance doctrine).
265
See infra Part IV.B–C.
266
See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Mark Glover, Rethinking
the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 100 (2014).
257
258
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compliance would reduce the chances of estate litigation
regarding testamentary intent.267 The experiences of foreign
jurisdictions that have adopted relaxed compliance rules confirm
this result, as these jurisdictions have not seen an increase in
informal will-execution.268
Additionally, the clarifying function does not justify the
strict compliance requirement’s place in the law of wills because
testators would likely execute their wills while relatively young
and in good health, even if a relaxed compliance rule were
adopted. The prevalence of deathbed wills has declined over the
course of many years.269 Whereas in earlier times, many
testators left the task of executing a will to the final moments of
their life,270 testators today typically understand the importance
of preparing an estate plan and generally execute wills before
reaching old age.271 As Langbein explains, “In the seventeenth
century when the first Wills Act was written, most wealth was in
the form of realty, and passed either by intestacy or conveyance.
Will making could thus be left to the end . . . .”272 By contrast, as
Gulliver and Tilson suggest, “[W]ills are [now] probably executed
by most testators in the prime of life and in the presence of
attorneys.”273 The benefits of the clarifying function therefore do
not warrant the strict compliance requirement’s continued role in
the probate process because testators are incentivized in other
ways to execute wills by means that produce clear evidence of
testamentary intent.

See Sherwin, supra note 72, at 469 (“A testator sufficiently informed to know
of the will statutes has powerful reasons to follow them, whether or not courts have
authority to accept defective wills.”); see also Miller, supra note 169, at 577 (arguing
that relaxed formalism will not “breed some contempt for the prescribed formalities”
because “human instinct is more likely to lead to a desire to do things properly”).
268
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 51–52 (concluding after a review of the
experience of a variety of foreign jurisdictions that a rule of relaxed compliance has
not “inspired testators to become sloppy about executing their wills”); see also Miller,
supra note 169, at 575 (explaining that “[t]he reported cases” in South Australia “do
not seem to reveal any weakening in the attitude to formalities”).
269
See Lindgren, supra note 75, at 554.
270
See id.
271
See id. at 555.
272
Langbein, supra note 1, at 496–97.
273
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 10.
267
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The second function of strict compliance is the deterrent
function.274 This function corresponds to the protective function
of testamentary formality and deters attempts of fraud.275
However, the deterrent function is susceptible to the same
criticism that has plagued formality’s protective function, and it
therefore does not support the continued use of the strict
compliance requirement.276 Criticism of formality’s protective
function extends back to the origins of the functional analysis of
will formalities, when Gulliver and Tilson argued that formality’s
goal of protecting the testator is “difficult to justify under modern
conditions.”277
This criticism is based on four arguments. First, the
objective of guarding testamentary intent from outside
imposition is at odds with formality’s tendency to undermine
testamentary intent.278 This result directly conflicts with the
goal of the law of wills and is aptly summarized by Langbein,
who explains simply that “[p]rotective formalities do more harm
than good.”279 Second, will formalities do not adequately protect
the testator.280 As exemplified by the many cases of attempted
fraud and undue influence, knowledgeable and determined
wrongdoers can circumvent formality’s protective measures.281
Third, the probate system possesses more effective methods of
identifying and rectifying instances of fraud and undue

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
276
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9–13; Langbein, supra note 1, at
496–97; Miller, supra note 71, at 271–73.
277
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9. Gulliver and Tilson further explain
that “while the provisions of the statutes of wills seeking to fulfill the protective
function must be reckoned with doctrinally as part of our enacted law, this function
is not sufficiently important in the present era to justify any more emphasis than
these provisions require.” Id. at 10.
278
See id. at 9 (“[T]here are numerous decisions interpreting these
requirements . . . wholly or partially invalidating wills that do not seem from the
opinions to be in any way improper or suspicious.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 496
(explaining that “formalities . . . void[] homemade wills for harmless violations”).
279
Langbein, supra note 1, at 496.
280
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9 (“[I]t is extremely doubtful that
these provisions effectively accomplish any important purpose.”); Langbein, supra
note 1, at 496.
281
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 496 (“The attestation formalities are pitifully
inadequate to protect the testator from determined crooks, and have not in fact
succeeded in preventing the many cases of fraud and undue influence which are
proved each year.”).
274
275
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influence.282
As Gulliver and Tilson explain, “there are
appropriate independent remedies for the various forms of
imposition, and these prophylactic [formalities] are therefore not,
in the long run, of any essential utility.”283 Finally, the instances
in which formality might prove useful to prevent fraud and
undue influence have decreased in modern times, as testators
typically execute wills earlier in life and with the aid of an
attorney.284 Testators are now therefore better equipped to
protect themselves.
These critiques of formality’s protective function directly
apply to the deterrent function of the strict compliance
requirement. First, while strict compliance deters attempts of
fraud, it also undermines testamentary intent, two results that
are at odds with each other.285 Second, the disincentive for fraud
does not deter all potential wrongdoers.286 Those who are brazen
enough to defraud the testator likely will not be stopped by the
possibility that their plan will fail. Third, the probate process
has other methods of detecting and preventing fraudulent wills
that deter attempts of fraud.287
Finally, because modern
testators generally execute wills earlier in life, they are in less
need of protection than their earlier counterparts and
consequently the need for deterrence is diminished.288 In short,
the deterrent function’s utility is questionable, and it therefore
does not justify the law’s insistence on strict compliance.
The strict compliance requirement’s third function is the
channeling function, which promotes the administrative
efficiency of the probate system by allowing the court to
determine whether the decedent intended to execute a will based

282
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9; Langbein, supra note 1, at 496
(“Protective formalities are not needed. Since fraud or undue influence may always
be proved notwithstanding due execution, the ordinary remedies for imposition are
quite adequate.”).
283
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 9.
284
See id. at 9–10 (“[T]he makers of wills are not a feeble or oppressed group of
people needing unusual protection as a class; on the contrary, as the owners of
property, earned or inherited, they are likely to be among the more capable and
dominant members of society.”); Langbein, supra note 1, at 496–97 (“The protective
policy is probably best explained as an historical anachronism.”).
285
See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
287
See supra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
288
See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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solely on compliance with the prescribed formalities.289 If the
decedent complies with the formalities of will-execution,
testamentary intent is presumed; if the decedent does not
comply, the will is invalid.290 In the past, probate courts typically
held an inferior status, possessing limited jurisdiction and often
staffed by non-lawyer judges,291 and therefore the channeling
function may have justified the strict compliance requirement’s
place in the probate process.
Due to their inferior status, probate courts were once better
equipped to perform administrative tasks rather than to
undertake the adjudicative responsibilities of other courts.292
Individualized determinations of testamentary intent by
unskilled judges based upon evidence other than mere formal
compliance could lead to inconsistent outcomes across similar
cases.293 The uncertainty produced by this inconsistency could, in
turn, increase the likelihood of probate litigation and disrupt the
efficiency of the probate system.294 With these concerns in mind,
Professor Bruce Mann explains that “[t]he underlying question is
how to limit the discretion of [probate] judges that are not chosen
or trained to perform general adjudicatory functions.”295

See supra Part III.C.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
291
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 502–03 (describing the “downgrading of
probate courts”); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills
Adjudication, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 39, 62 (1985) (“Probate courts in most states
customarily were courts of inferior status and limited jurisdiction. The office of
probate judge was often a part-time one that required little, if any, professional
training.” (footnote omitted)).
292
See Mann, supra note 291, at 62 (“The responsibilities of the probate judge
tended to be ministerial . . . . The functions of probate courts in wills matters were
essentially administrative—to determine whether or not to accept the will for
probate, issue the necessary letters, approve the final accounting, and similar
tasks.”).
293
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 51 (reporting that an English law reform
committee declined to recommend reform of the strict compliance requirement due
to concerns “that by making it less certain whether or not an informally executed
will is capable of being admitted to probate, [a dispensing power] could lead to
litigation, expense, and delay” (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
294
See Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2010) (“A leading model posits that uncertainty over the
outcome of a will contest drives litigation.”).
295
Mann, supra note 291, at 63.
289
290
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One strategy to minimize the discretion of probate courts
and foster consistent outcomes is to transform the determination
of testamentary intent into a largely ministerial duty by
requiring probate judges to evaluate testamentary intent based
solely on formal compliance.296
As Mann explains, “The
requirement of strict compliance with the [W]ills [A]ct formalities
limits discretionary interpretation of the formalities by
discouraging anything other than mechanical, literal application
of them.”297 The strict compliance requirement’s channeling
function therefore “provid[es] a measure of control over probate
courts of limited jurisdiction.”298
The utility of the channeling function, however, has been
diminished by a change in the nature of probate courts. While
the law has maintained the strict compliance requirement’s place
in the probate system, the status of probate courts and the
qualifications of probate judges generally have increased.
Whereas seventy years ago about half of the states staffed
probate courts with non-lawyers,299 today only four states allow
laymen to preside over the probate system.300 Moreover, some
states have reallocated probate responsibilities to courts of
general jurisdiction, which have greater experience with making
adjudicative determinations.301 Because probate courts are now
generally better equipped to make individualized determinations

296
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 503 (“It is open to argument that the rule of
literal compliance with the Wills Act formalities is the doctrinal consequence of the
inferior status of the probate courts. Such courts cannot be trusted with anything
more complicated than a wholly mechanical rule.”).
297
Mann, supra note 291, at 64.
298
Id.; see also Langbein, supra note 1, at 503.
299
See Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court
in America: II, 43 MICH. L. REV. 113, 139 (1944).
300
See James Findley, Note, The Debate Over Nonlawyer Probate Judges: A
Historical Perspective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2010) (“Today, only Alabama,
Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey allow nonlawyers to become judges
handling matters of probate, and in some states, existing nonlawyer probate judges
continue to serve under grandfather clauses.”).
301
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 503 n.62 (explaining that “the recent trend is
to upgrade the probate courts to the status of courts of general jurisdiction”); Mann,
supra note 291, at 62–63 (“The small but growing number of jurisdictions that have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code have consolidated the probate court as a division
of the trial court of general jurisdiction with full adjudicative power. Other states
have given the probate court the powers of a court of general jurisdiction over
probate matters.” (footnote omitted)).
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of testamentary intent in a consistent and reliable manner,302 the
utility of the strict compliance requirement’s channeling function
is diminished.
Moreover, the channeling function’s utility is further
diminished by the way that modern probate courts apply the rule
of strict compliance. Sympathetic judges, bothered by the harsh
consequences of the rule, have searched for ways to save wills
that do not strictly comply with the prescribed formalities.303 As
Langbein explains, “Many of the formalities have produced a
vast, contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case
law in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in cases
which in fact instance defective compliance.”304 This willingness
to relax the rule of strict compliance through ad hoc exceptions
creates uncertainty in the rule’s application and consequently
invites litigation.305
By allowing litigation regarding the
testator’s compliance with the formalities, the inconsistent
application of the strict compliance requirement undermines the
channeling function’s goal of promoting the efficiency of the
probate system.
Because probate courts have opened the door for litigation
regarding formal compliance, if the rule of strict compliance were
replaced by a relaxed formal compliance standard, probate
litigation levels likely would not increase dramatically.306 Much
of the litigation produced by these reforms would simply replace

302
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 525 (“[T]he litigation which would occur would
for the most part raise familiar issues which the courts have demonstrated their
ability to handle well. We have seen that the elements of the substantial compliance
doctrine arise in other contexts in current litigation when courts examine whether
purported wills evidence testamentary intent and were executed freely and with
finality.”).
303
See id.; see also Lindgren, supra note 75, at 572.
304
Langbein, supra note 1, at 525; see also Lindgren, supra note 75, at 572
(“There have been several thousand American appellate opinions on the attestation
requirement alone—case reports that should leave any neutral observer wondering
whether anything worthwhile is being accomplished.” (footnote omitted)).
305
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 28 (“[T]he rule of strict compliance may
actually promote litigation, by inciting courts to bend the ostensible rules in ways
that make the outcomes hard to predict.”); see also Lindgren, supra note 75, at 572
(“Courts . . . often decide like cases dissimilarly because some courts will strain to
avoid the unduly harsh rules for formal validity. Thus, even where the case or
statutory law seems to be clear, disappointed beneficiaries will still litigate to try to
win their devises.”).
306
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 525; Lindgren, supra note 167, at 1016.
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the litigation produced by the rule of strict compliance.307 As
Langbein expounds, “The choice is not between litigation and no
litigation. In cases of defective compliance the important choice
is between litigation resolved purposefully and honestly under
the substantial compliance doctrine [or the harmless error rule],
or irrationally and sometimes dishonestly under the rule of
literal compliance.”308 Therefore, the utility of the channeling
function is diminished because the lax application of the strict
compliance requirement has generated litigation regarding
formal compliance.
The final function of strict compliance is the impediment
function.309
This function ensures that all testamentary
documents that do not display objective evidence of careful and
considered planning are invalid.310 In the past, when courts and
legislatures sometimes hinted at their preference for intestacy,
the impediment function may have been an implicit check on
testamentary freedom.311
Today, however, respect for
testamentary intent is the cornerstone of the law of wills.312
Given the strict compliance requirement’s effect of
indiscriminately invaliding genuine expressions of testamentary
intent, the impediment function is directly at odds with the law’s
fundamental objective. As such, the impediment function no
longer justifies the law’s continued adherence to strict
compliance.
The other functions of strict compliance similarly undermine
testamentary freedom’s fundamental status. If the fulfillment of
the testator’s intent is the primary goal of the law of wills, the
policies served by the clarifying function, the deterrent function,
and the channeling function are necessarily of secondary
importance. Moreover, as described above, the utility of each
function of strict compliance has decreased over time. Because
they are of diminished importance and are at odds with the law’s
307
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 525 (“The substantial compliance doctrine
would not simply add to the existing stock of probate litigation, but would to some
extent substitute one type of dispute for another.”); Lindgren, supra note 167, at
1016 (“Litigation about formalities will lessen; litigation about testamentary intent
will increase.”).
308
Langbein, supra note 1, at 526.
309
See supra Part III.D.
310
See supra Part III.D.
311
See supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text.
312
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 491.

FINAL_GLOVER

2014]

4/17/2015 12:55 PM

DECOUPLING THE LAW OF WILL-EXECUTION

645

goal of effectuating testamentary intent, the functions of strict
compliance no longer justify the rule’s place in the law of wills.
As such, the strict compliance requirement should be replaced by
a relaxed formal compliance standard.
B.

The Substantial Compliance Doctrine

The substantial compliance doctrine is the first alternative
to the strict compliance requirement.313 This doctrine, which was
proposed by Langbein, would allow courts to validate a formally
deficient document if the testator intended to execute a will and
substantially complied with the formalities.314 Although the
substantial compliance doctrine has not been widely adopted, the
functional analysis of strict compliance confirms the merits of
Langbein’s attempt to construct a relaxed formal compliance
standard.315
However, the analysis also suggests that the
structure and mechanics of Langbein’s substantial compliance
doctrine are flawed.
Consider, for instance, the two components of the substantial
compliance doctrine: (1) the identification of testamentary intent
and (2) a determination of whether the functions of formality
have been fulfilled.316 Although a finding of testamentary intent
is a logical requirement for the validity of a will, the need for
independent confirmation that the functions of formality have
been served is less clear. If the court is convinced that a
particular document represents a legitimate attempt to exercise
testamentary power, then the will necessarily fulfills
testamentary formality’s primary purpose of providing a reliable
and accurate record of testamentary intent. After this finding,
further inquiry into the purposes of will formalities is largely
duplicative because the court would have been unsure of the
testator’s intent had the will’s form not adequately served the
functions of testamentary formality.317
Langbein’s reaction to the judicial employment of the
substantial compliance doctrine in Australia demonstrates the
confusion caused by the doctrine’s two-pronged construction.
After proposing the doctrine and its two independent
313
314
315
316
317

See generally id.
See Lester, supra note 7, at 579–80.
See supra Part IV.A.
See Langbein, supra note 1, at 513.
See Langbein, supra note 6, at 43.
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components, Langbein later criticized Australian courts for not
focusing exclusively on the showing of testamentary intent.318
For example, he complains that “courts read into their
substantial compliance doctrine a near-miss standard, ignoring
the central issue of whether the testator’s conduct evidenced
testamentary intent.”319
Langbein’s reaction to a decision from the Australian state of
Queensland is particularly illustrative. He recounts the decision
of a judge who declined to find that a testator substantially
complied with the prescribed formalities despite clear evidence
that the document reflected testamentary intent.320 Langbein
then ponders rhetorically, “What could ‘substantial compliance’
mean if the testator’s conduct can evince unmistakable
testamentary intent and still be insubstantial?”321 This retort
and his other comments regarding the judicial application of the
substantial compliance doctrine suggests that the finding of
testamentary intent is tantamount to a determination that the
decedent’s method of will-execution fulfilled the functions of will
formalities.
This construction of the substantial compliance doctrine,
which focuses on testamentary intent but also references
formality’s functions, contains two flaws. First, the doctrine
implicitly abandons formality’s cautionary function.
The
cautionary function is the only function of will formalities that
does not focus on the court’s recognition of the testator’s intent to
execute a will. The cautionary function instead is concerned with
the testator’s formulation of testamentary intent.322
By
impressing the importance and legal significance of the

See id.
Id. at 53.
320
See id. at 43.
321
Id. Langbein and other scholars may be clear as to what substantial
compliance means. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 167, at 1014 (“As a former student
of Langbein’s, I consider myself a Langbeinian in these matters; I know what John
meant. I wouldn’t have had trouble applying his test, nor do I think that anyone who
very carefully read his work would have trouble.”). However, others are not so
certain. See, e.g., Nelson & Starck, supra note 118, at 355 (“A second problem is the
ambiguity of ‘substantial compliance.’ Does it mean that whenever the previously set
forth goals have been met, we then have substantial compliance? Does it mean that
some formalities are more important than others and that substantial compliance
involves completion of only the important formalities?” (footnote omitted)).
322
See supra Part II.D.
318
319
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testamentary act upon the testator, the cautionary function helps
ensure that the testator approaches the execution of a will with
proper planning and consideration.323
By focusing primarily on the existence of testamentary
intent, the substantial compliance doctrine largely ignores the
process by which the testator forms that intent, thereby valuing
the evidentiary, protective, and signaling functions over the
cautionary function.
A relaxed compliance rule need not
necessarily take into account the cautionary function, but if the
rule’s proponents intend to disregard formality’s cautionary
value, they should do so explicitly in order to avoid confusion
regarding the proper mechanics of the substantial compliance
analysis. The substantial compliance doctrine’s failure in this
regard is especially confusing given that it does not merely omit
the cautionary function from consideration but specifically claims
to take into account all functions of formality, including the
cautionary function.324
The substantial compliance doctrine’s second flaw is that its
concern with the functions of formality obscures the role that the
functions of strict compliance play in the substantial compliance
analysis.
More specifically, because traditional functional
analysis conflates the functions of formality with those of strict
compliance,325 the substantial compliance doctrine’s second prong
raises the issue of whether courts should consider the functions
of strict compliance. On the one hand, consideration of the
functions of strict compliance would make more sense than
consideration of formality’s functions because formality’s primary
purpose of providing reliable evidence of testamentary intent is
already taken into account by the doctrine’s first prong.326 On the
other hand, the reform movement’s goal is to relax the formalism
of strict compliance,327 and, as such, fulfillment of strict
compliance’s functions is at odds with the purpose of the
substantial compliance reform.
The confusion caused by these flaws is evident in case law,
which suggests that courts are sometimes reluctant to implement
the substantial compliance doctrine out of concerns relating to
323
324
325
326
327

See Langbein, supra note 1, at 494–95; Miller, supra note 71, at 261–62.
See Langbein, supra note 1.
See supra Parts II–III.
See supra notes 316–17 and accompanying text.
See Langbein, supra note 1.
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the functions of strict compliance.328 For example, in a case in
which it declined to apply the substantial compliance doctrine,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana explained:
The fact that there is no fraud [in a given case] . . . will not
justify the courts in departing from the statutory requirements,
even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any
material relaxation of the statutory or codal rule will open up a
fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and imposition.329

Because the court focused on the effect that the substantial
compliance doctrine would have on the probate system generally
and not on the individual testator, this language suggests that
the court was concerned with the effects that a relaxed
compliance rule would have on the deterrent function of strict
compliance.330 Likewise, courts sometimes express concerns
regarding the negative effects that the substantial compliance
doctrine would have on the administration of the probate
system,331 thereby raising concerns related to the channeling
function of strict compliance.332 As exemplified by these cases,
concerns regarding the effect of the substantial compliance
doctrine on the functions of strict compliance may have
contributed to the reform effort’s failure.
In sum, the functional analysis of strict compliance
illuminates flaws of the substantial compliance doctrine. These
flaws lie not with the doctrine’s policy objectives, but instead
stem from the doctrine’s implicit analytical omissions.333 By not
328
See, e.g., In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1014 (N.J. 1987) (“Our courts
have thus acknowledged the important policy interest advanced by a rule of strict
compliance.”).
329
Succession of Roussel, 373 So. 2d 155, 157 (La. 1979).
330
See supra Part III.B.
331
See, e.g., Peters, 526 A.2d at 1015 (“To adopt the doctrine of substantial
compliance . . . would unsettle the probate process . . . .”); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708
S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. App. 1986) (“We conclude that we cannot properly apply [the
substantial compliance doctrine]. Such a departure from Code requirements would
lead to confusion and uncertainty, which the Code seeks to avoid.”). Courts also often
reject the substantial compliance doctrine while providing no explanation. See
Mann, supra note 30, at 1039.
332
See supra Part III.C.
333
See supra notes 322–32 and accompanying text. As others have noted, the
term, “substantial compliance,” may have added to the confusion. See Miller, supra
note 71, at 307 (“Since Langbein’s substantial compliance doctrine is predicated on
the ‘compliance’ of an otherwise defective execution with the functions of the wills
act formalities as the test for determining whether the defect should be treated as
harmless error, a more descriptive and less misleading term would be ‘functional
compliance.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
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acknowledging formality’s cautionary function or the functions of
strict compliance, and by not expressly advocating a relaxed
compliance rule’s effect on these functions, proponents of reform
contribute unnecessary confusion to the reform effort. This
confusion likely has hindered the push for reform and has
ultimately led to the abandonment of the substantial compliance
doctrine as the preferred alternative to the rule of strict
compliance. By contrast, if the intent to diminish the functions
of strict compliance were made explicit and the benefits of such a
change were made clear, the substantial compliance doctrine
may have been more widely applied and more liberally construed.
C.

The Harmless Error Rule

The second alternative to the strict compliance requirement
is the harmless error rule, which would allow a court to validate
a formally defective document based solely on whether the
testator left behind clear and convincing evidence of
testamentary intent.334
Unlike the substantial compliance
doctrine, the harmless error rule does not require the probate
court to consider whether the testator’s method of will-execution
sufficiently fulfills the functions of will formalities.335 The
harmless error rule’s single prong construction eliminates some
of the confusion raised by the substantial compliance doctrine’s
focus on the functions of testamentary formality.
By removing all discussion of formality’s functions, the
harmless error rule makes no illusions that formality’s
cautionary function should be included in the harmless error
analysis.336 Moreover, the rule’s sole focus on testamentary
intent may also reduce the confusion caused by the reform
movement’s conflation of the functions of formality and the
functions of the strict compliance requirement.337 The harmless
error rule has garnered widespread support within the reform
movement, including among legal scholars338 and the drafters of
both the UPC339 and the Restatement (Third) of Property.340
See generally Langbein, supra note 6.
See Lester, supra note 7, at 580.
336
See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text.
337
See supra notes 325–32 and accompanying text.
338
See, e.g, Langbein, supra note 6, at 6–7; Lester, supra note 7, at 606;
Lindgren, supra note 167, at 1016.
339
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997) (“Although a
document . . . was not executed in compliance with [the prescribed formalities], the
334
335
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Moreover, whereas courts have “rarely fully embrace[d] the
[substantial compliance] doctrine,”341 ten states have passed
legislation approving the use of the harmless error rule,342
including one state in which courts had previously used the
substantial compliance doctrine.343 Nonetheless, despite this
relative success, the vast majority of states continue to judge the
validity of wills based upon the traditional strict compliance
requirement.
Recognizing the connection between the harmless error
rule’s comparative clarity and its relative success, this Article
seeks to awaken renewed support of reform by bringing further
transparency to the costs and benefits of the harmless error rule.
By providing a focused picture of the need to replace the strict
compliance requirement and of the benefits of a relaxed formal
compliance rule, this Article’s functional analysis of strict
compliance hones the arguments in favor of reform. The
clarification and refinement of this call for reform increases the
likelihood that policymakers will recognize the need for change in
this area, and, as a result, Langbein’s hope for widespread
adoption of the harmless error rule may eventually be realized.
CONCLUSION
A reform movement in the law of wills has long called for the
relaxation of the formalism that requires all testators to strictly
comply with the prescribed formalities of will-execution.344
However, this push for reform has largely failed, as the vast
majority of states maintains the traditional rule and requires
strict formal compliance from all testators.345 In an effort to
document . . . is treated as if it had been executed in compliance . . . if the proponent
of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document . . . to constitute . . . the decedent’s will. . . .”).
340
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999) (“A harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the
proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent adopted
the document as his or her will.”).
341
Lester, supra note 7, at 601.
342
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 184 (explaining that a version
of the harmless error rule has been adopted in California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia).
343
See Lester, supra note 7, at 601.
344
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1.
345
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 184; Lester, supra note 7, at
601.
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spark renewed support for change in this context, this Article
develops an innovative framework through which to analyze
various proposed reforms of the traditional strict compliance
requirement.346 Specifically, this Article argues that a functional
analysis of strict compliance should drive the reform effort and
suggests that, once the purposes of the requirement are
identified, reform in this area may be more likely.
This framework is built upon the insight that the analytical
foundation of the reform movement’s case for change is flawed.
Consider, for example, the triumphant call for reform that
concludes Langbein’s seminal article in support of a relaxed
formal compliance standard. Langbein proclaims, “The rule of
literal compliance has outlived whatever utility it may have had.
The time for the substantial compliance doctrine has come.”347
Despite this reference to the utility of the strict compliance
requirement, Langbein constructs his argument for reform upon
a functional analysis of testamentary formality.348 Instead of
focusing on the utility of strict compliance, Langbein largely
devotes his analysis to the utility of will formalities.349
Formality and the rule of strict compliance, however, are
different components of the law of wills, and each serves distinct
purposes. Whereas the formalities of writing, signature, and
attestation serve functions that aid in the fulfillment of
testamentary intent, the formalism of the strict compliance
requirement serves functions that often undermine testamentary
intent. By focusing on the functions of testamentary formality,
instead of on the functions of strict compliance, the reform
movement obscures the need for reform and adds confusion to the
various reform proposals.
By contrast, this Article clarifies the reform effort by
focusing on the functional analysis of strict compliance.
Specifically, it identifies the functions of strict compliance, which
although are similar to the functions of testamentary formality,
are separate and discrete. These functions include the clarifying
function,350 the deterrent function,351 the channeling function,352
346
347
348
349
350
351
352

See supra Parts II–III.
Langbein, supra note 1, at 531.
See id. at 491–98.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
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and the impediment function.353
This functional analysis
illuminates both the benefits of a relaxed formal compliance
standard and the costs of the traditional strict compliance
requirement.354
Ultimately, this Article echoes Langbein’s
proclamation in support of reform and demonstrates that the rule
of strict compliance has indeed outlived whatever utility it may
have had. Thus, equipped with this Article’s novel analytical
framework, the reform effort can move forward with refined
purpose and renewed vigor.

353
354

See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part IV.

